Tag: punishment

Bioethics Blogs

Politics of Pain: Investigating the Ethics of Palliative Care as a Global Human Right

by Alix Masters

Within the last decade, strides have been made in the field of global health policy to extend the reaches of palliative care universally.  In 2014, the World Health Organization formally declared palliative care a global human right.[1] This development in global health policy is a positive one when we consider the medical politics of pain relief across racial difference.  Both in the United States and abroad, there is a long medical history of discriminatory practices against certain groups of people with regard to pain management—including withholding necessary pain medication altogether.  Therefore, in many ways the declaration of palliative care as a human right is a necessary step in ensuring all peoples, regardless of identity, have their pain taken seriously by the medical establishment and have their comfort made a medical priority.  When we consider how different cultures negotiate beliefs around death and pain relief, however, the issue of palliative care as a universal human right becomes more complex.  For example, countries with strong histories of Buddhist thought and culture have traditionally opposed the ideology of palliative care.[26]  In Buddhism, suffering is considered an inextricable part of life and masking this suffering through medical intervention is looked down upon.[2]  For example, Vietnam, a country with a culture strongly imbued with Eastern Buddhist values, has a long history of rejecting palliative care and pain medications in general.[26]  Due to this, the World Health Organization’ declaration that palliative care is a universal human right could also be understood as a Western organization blatantly ignoring Buddhist cultural traditions. 

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

The Neuroethics Blog Series on Black Mirror: White Bear

By Kristie Garza
Image courtesy of  Wikimedia Commons.

Humans in the 21st century have an intimate relationship with technology. Much of our lives are spent being informed and entertained by screens. Technological advancements in science and medicine have helped and healed in ways we previously couldn’t dream of. But what unanticipated consequences of the rapid expansion into new technological territory? This question is continually being explored in the British sci-fi TV series Black Mirror, which provides a glimpse into the not-so-distant future and warns us to be mindful of how we treat our technology and how it can affect us in return. This piece is part of a series of posts that discuss ethical issues surrounding neuro-technologies featured in the show and will compare how similar technologies are impacting us in the real world. 



*SPOILER ALERT* – The following contains plot spoilers for the Netflix television series Black Mirror. 

Plot Summary


“White Bear” begins with Victoria, the episode’s main character, awakening in an unfamiliar room in front of a TV displaying an unfamiliar symbol. She has no memory of who she is or how she wound up in the room.
Afraid, Victoria begins to explore her outside surroundings, where she finds “onlookers,” individuals in a trance-like state, filming her with their phones. A masked man then appears and begins chasing Victoria. While fleeing, she meets Jem, a fellow individual not under the trance. Jem explains to Victoria that the onlookers were put in their trance due to the strange symbol on the screens and that the masked man is a “hunter,” part of an evil people not affected by the strange symbol.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

Transhumanism. Error of the gods and the power of man? A phylosofical approach

Technological progress urgently needs the emergence of moral progress so that the spark of reason does not consume the existence of humankind

The technical skills of humans have always been remarkable throughout history, so much so that, even now, the artifacts of classical antiquity leave us astounded at the ingenuity of man. Those who are familiar with the Antikythera mechanism (see video HERE) can attest to the fact that the complexity of this computing system, devised to calculate the movement of the stars, is staggering. The wonder that our creations elicit in us might make us think that the creative and technical ability that characterizes us has a divine origin.

It was Plato, among others, who described in his Protagoras, and put into the mouth of the famous Athenian sophist, the myth of the formation of man. In it, the gods forge the mortal races from other gods that have not yet finished forming in the elements of earth and fire. Thus, the gods command the brothers Prometheus and Epimetheus to capture these incomplete gods and divide their abilities to distribute them among the mortal races. Hence, the link of the mortal races with the gods is obvious according to the myth, because they are formed from the fragments of incomplete gods.

Epimetheus asks Prometheus to allow him to take charge of the formation of the new races, and distributes the fragmented abilities. His intention is to create a balance between the new beings so that they do not destroy each other. Those that enjoy some advantage over the rest are surpassed by others in another aspect.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

REGISTER NOW! Behind Bars: Ethics and Human Rights in U.S. Prisons

Behind Bars: Ethics and Human Rights in U.S. Prisons November 30 – December 1, 2017 Harvard Medical School campus Longwood Medical Area, Boston, MA The United States leads the world in incarceration. The “War on Drugs” and prioritizing punishment over … Continue reading

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Criminal Law and Neuroscience: Hope or Hype?

By Stephen J. Morse

Stephen J. Morse, J.D., Ph.D., is a lawyer and a psychologist. He is Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law, Professor of Psychology and Law in Psychiatry, and Associate Director of the Center for Neuroscience & Society at the University of Pennsylvania. Professor Morse is also a Diplomate in Forensic Psychology of the American Board of Professional Psychology. He has been working on the relation of neuroscience to law, ethics and social policy for over two decades, has written numerous articles and book chapters on these topics and has edited A Primer on Neuroscience and Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2013, with Adina Roskies). He was previously Co-Director of the MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project and was a member of the MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Research Network. Professor Morse is a recipient of the American Academy of Forensic Psychology’s Distinguished Contribution Award, and a recipient of the American Psychiatric Association’s Isaac Ray Award for distinguished contributions to forensic psychiatry and the psychiatric aspects of jurisprudence. 

The discovery of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in 1991, which permits non-invasive imaging of brain function, and the wide availability of scanners for research starting in about 2000 fueled claims that what we would learn about the brain and behavior would transform and perhaps revolutionize criminal law. Most commonly, many thought that traditional notions of criminal responsibility would be undermined for various reasons, such as demonstrating that people really cannot control themselves as well as we believe, or as indicating that more action was automatic, thoughtless and non-rational than we think.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Speculation, Certainty and the Diagnostic Illusory: The Tricorder and the Deathless Man by Thierry Jutel

In the paragraphs which follow, we will be discussing the ways in which two pieces of speculative fiction, the science fiction film Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home, and the novel The Tiger’s Wife use diagnostic and prognostic certainty as part of their creative narratives. In both cases, the confidence vested in the diagnosis and its outcome is contrasted to the “diagnostic illusory” of contemporary medicine.

Even while diagnosis is medicine’s primary classification tool, it is far less circumscribed than diagnostic taxonomies suggest, as well as the power afforded those who diagnose. Even very material conditions have porous boundaries (Jutel 2013) which muddy the waters in a system that is based on tidy categories. Sarah Nettleton and her colleagues have developed the term “diagnostic illusory” to describe how medicine invests in generalisation as a way of understanding disease. In the diagnostic illusory, for the cases that resists classification, or perturb a diagnostic category, one turns to ever-more sophisticated forms of technology, with the belief that it’s just a matter of time before the explanation will become clear, and the diagnosis justified. Nettleton and her colleagues raise the idea of “illusory” to highlight the “ambiguities and nuanced complexities associated with the biomedical imperative to name and classify” (Nettleton, Kitzinger, and Kitzinger 2014).

In this short essay, we will explore how two speculative texts represent diagnosis, highlighting through their respectively futuristic and supernatural approaches the yearnings of contemporary medicine, and the society it serves, for diagnostic certainty.

 

Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home and the Tricorder

In the science fiction epic Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home (Nimoy 1986), the Starship Enterprise and its crew have come back to planet earth in 1986 to save the humpback whale from extinction and by extension, to save planet earth from destruction in the future.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: What Makes Discrimination Wrong? Written by Paul de Font-Reaulx

This essay was the winner in the Undergraduate Category of the Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics 2017

Written by University of Oxford student, Paul de Font-Reaulx

 

The question of this essay is this: What makes discrimination wrong? Most of us intuitively take discrimination based on gender or ethnicity to be impermissible because we have strong rights to be treated on the basis of merit and capacity rather than e.g. ethnicity or gender. I argue that this suggestion is indefensible. I show that well-informed discrimination can sometimes be permissible, and even morally required, meaning we cannot have absolute rights not to be discriminated against. In the last part I suggest an alternative account, arguing that acts of discrimination are wrong because they violate individuals’ weak right to be treated fairly and create negative externalities which – analogously to pollution – there is a collective responsibility to minimize. These results are counterintuitive, and require further attention.

1.     What is Discrimination?

I take discrimination to be to treat someone very differently based on an irrelevant trait. A trait is relevant if and only if it by itself provides reasons for different treatment in some instance, such as constituting a difference in merit or capacity. Otherwise it is irrelevant. For example, in the case of boxing the trait of weighing 70kg is relevant for finding opponents, while as the trait of hair colour is not. Of the two, only different treatment on the basis of the latter would constitute discrimination[1].

Discrimination based on bigotry such as racism is often indefensible simply because it rests on ungrounded beliefs about the relevance of traits such as ethnicity.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

40th Annual Health Law Professors Conference

If you teach health law, come to the 40th Annual Health Law Professors Conference, June 8-10, 2017, at Georgia State University College of Law in Atlanta.  Here is the schedule:


Thursday, June 8, 2017
8:00-12:00 AM Tour of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Separate registration is required. Participants meet in the lobby of Georgia State Law to take a shuttle to the CDC.)


9:45 – 11:15 AM Tour of Grady Health System (Separate registration is required. Participants meet in the lobby of Georgia State Law and will walk over to Grady as a group.)


2:00 – 5:00 PM Conference Registration – Henson Atrium, Georgia State Law


3:00 – 5:00 PM Jay Healey Teaching Session – Knowles Conference Center, Georgia State Law
Experiential Teaching and Learning in Health Law
The format for this session is World Café roundtables, with plenty of opportunity for the collegial exchange of teaching ideas and insights among your colleagues. Come prepared for a lively, interactive workshop.
World Café Hosts:
Dayna Matthew, University of Colorado Law School
Charity Scott, Georgia State University College of Law
Sidney Watson, Saint Louis University School of Law
Invited Discussants and Participants:
Rodney Adams, Virginia Commonwealth University School of Health Administration
Christina Juris Bennett, University of Oklahoma College of Law
Amy Campbell, University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law
Michael Campbell, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Erin Fuse Brown, Georgia State University College of Law
Cynthia Ho, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law
Danielle Pelfrey Duryea, University of Buffalo School of Law, State University of New York
Jennifer Mantel, University of Houston Law Center
Elizabeth McCuskey, University of Toledo College of Law
Laura McNally-Levine, Case Western Reserve University School of Law
Jennifer Oliva, West Virginia University College of Law and School of Public Health
Thaddeus Pope, Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Lauren Roth, St.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

The moral bioenhancement of psychopaths

Guest Post: Elvio Baccarini and Luca Malatesti

Paper: The Moral Bioenhancement of Psychopaths

We argue that the prescription of mandatory moral bioenhancement (from now on MB) of psychopaths is justified because it satisfies the requirement of public reason as elaborated in political philosophy. This is the requirement that a moral or political prescription should be justifiable to all those persons over whom the prescription purports to have authority.

We maintain that, in this case, a notion of open justification is appropriate to state the requirement of public reason. An open justification of a prescription addressed to an agent is a reasoning grounded on premises that consider the system of reasons (such as beliefs, preferences, etc.) of that agent. Thus, it could be said that this type of justification has an internal dimension, given that it considers reasons that are endorsed by the agent. However, an open justification has also an external dimension. This type of justification does not require that the agent is aware or accepts all its inferential steps. It requires, instead, that she would be aware or accept them by reasoning correctly from her system of reasons. Furthermore, we argue that the mandatory MB is openly justified to psychopaths.

We are aware of the controversies about the MB of psychopaths that stem from empirical and theoretical issues concerning the robustness of the construct of psychopathy and the validity of different diagnostic measure, the specific nature of their differences with non-psychopathic agents and the availability of safe and reliable biomedical treatments.  We think, however, that it is meaningful investigating the moral significance of the application of present or proximate future scientific research on the enhancement of individuals with antisocial conditions.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

A Bioethics View of Executions in Arkansas

by Craig Klugman, Ph.D.

This week the state of Arkansas had planned to execute 8 death-row inmates in 4, back-to-back killings using lethal injection over 10 days. The last execution in Arkansas was 12 years ago, so why the sudden rush? As part of the three-drug cocktail used by this state, their supply of midazolam—an anesthetic—is about to expire. If they do not use the drug by the expiration date, then they can’t use it and the company that makes the drug will not sell it to the state for this purpose.

Arkansas had planned to use a combination of 3 drugs in the execution, midazolam (an anesthetic), vecuronium bromide (a paralytic), potassium chloride (to stop the heart). This cocktail would be used to kill the 8 men.

I say “had planned” because last week, two of the prisoners had judges issue stays on their executions. This move is not unusual as there is often a flurry of court appeals and filings in the time before an execution. What is unusual is that over the weekend, another judge placed a stay on all executions on the request of drug companies and distributors—Pfizer, Fresenius, West-Ward Pharmaceuticals, and McKesson—who do not want their drugs to be used in an execution. McKesson’s concern is that when they learned the reason the state bought the vecuronium bromide, that they refunded the cost and asked for the drug to be returned. Drug manufacturers and distributors have come out against their products being used to kill prisoners. The association is unlikely to be good for sales or brand reputation.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.