Tag: alternatives

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Incidental White Privilege

STUDENT VOICES

By Jade Reyes

Not every issue of morality that we are faced with is easily discernible— with an easily ascertainable correct action. Many of these issues are nuanced and multifaceted, affecting every person differently and involves a weighing process between imperfect alternatives. One of those issues is race or ethnicity and furthermore the perceptions and assumptions that come hand in hand. Race and racial prejudice are intricately woven into the fabric of American history. While the most prominent struggle between Whites and Blacks is entrenched in the legacy of slavery, another more subtle battle persists. This battle, in my personal experience, blurs the line of ethical and moral behavior in many settings; particularly social and business relations. This struggle is the plight of those who pass for another race– specifically those non-Whites who may be perceived as White, such as myself. This presents a unique moral and ethical challenge: having to toe the line between my ‘by chance’ white privilege and allegiance to my ethnic background.

Often the struggle to which I refer is given the name of colorism, in which light skin tones are preferred and fare better in arbitrary categories when compared to darker skin tones. There is this persistent trend; according to the historical record that having lighter skin regardless of your racial or ethnic origin is a good thing— a door opener if you will. For fair-skinned Latinas like myself, the identifier of white is available to me, but it comes as a powerful oxymoron to define myself as a white-Latino.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Uncategorized

Incidental White Privilege

STUDENT VOICES

By Jade Reyes

Not every issue of morality that we are faced with is easily discernible— with an easily ascertainable correct action. Many of these issues are nuanced and multifaceted, affecting every person differently and involves a weighing process between imperfect alternatives. One of those issues is race or ethnicity and furthermore the perceptions and assumptions that come hand in hand. Race and racial prejudice are intricately woven into the fabric of American history. While the most prominent struggle between Whites and Blacks is entrenched in the legacy of slavery, another more subtle battle persists. This battle, in my personal experience, blurs the line of ethical and moral behavior in many settings; particularly social and business relations. This struggle is the plight of those who pass for another race– specifically those non-Whites who may be perceived as White, such as myself. This presents a unique moral and ethical challenge: having to toe the line between my ‘by chance’ white privilege and allegiance to my ethnic background.

Often the struggle to which I refer is given the name of colorism, in which light skin tones are preferred and fare better in arbitrary categories when compared to darker skin tones. There is this persistent trend; according to the historical record that having lighter skin regardless of your racial or ethnic origin is a good thing— a door opener if you will. For fair-skinned Latinas like myself, the identifier of white is available to me, but it comes as a powerful oxymoron to define myself as a white-Latino.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Increasing Access to Biosimilar Drugs

The development of ‘specialty drugs’
in the health care industry has created legal, ethical, and public policy
issues because patients are not able to get access to their prescribed
medications based on the expense.  Specialty
drugs are usually biologicals, treat serious conditions, and  are very expensive with no cheap
alternatives.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Ethical questions about mitochondrial replacement in humans. Three parents babies

We thus consider it necessary to establish a moratorium on their use in humans, at least until more is known about these aspects. If this knowledge is obtained, ethical questions would still remain to be resolved, among which we consider the most relevant to be those related to the dignity and identity of the human embryo.

Children with two mothers and a father

In January 2017, the prestigious scientific journal Bioethics published a special edition dedicated to the ethical aspects of nuclear transfer techniques aimed at preventing the transmission of mitochondrial diseases, a topic that we have extensively addressed in our Observatory (see HERE).

Its editorial, Ethics of mitochondrial replacement, starts by referring to the recent birth of the first baby resulting from these techniques (see HERE). It then provides a brief description of the main characteristics of mitochondrial diseases, which are inherited exclusively from the mother. It explains that mothers who carry mutations in their mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) face the uncertainty of not knowing if their genetic children will or will not inherit a serious mitochondrial disease. However the emergence of mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRT) offers these mothers hope, as healthy mitochondria from a donor are used to replace those of the mother. These techniques are maternal spindle transfer (MST) and pronuclear transfer (PNT), which consist, respectively, in removing the nucleus from a healthy egg or zygote, which will keep its mitochondria. The nucleus of the mother’s oocyte (patient or carrier of the mutation) or of another zygote obtained by fertilising the mothers egg is then transferred into the enucleated oocyte or zygote.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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The ethnographic case: series conclusion by Emily Yates-Doerr

Editors note: This entry concludes the series “The Ethnographic Case” which ran every other Monday between June 2015 and July 2016. The bookCase, which holds 27 cases, can be accessed here.

One day, early on in the series, we received two submissions. Their similar anatomy was striking. Each featured a medical waiting room. Someone entered the space with a gift for the clinical personnel, the gift was accepted, and something shifted in the resulting care.

In Aaron Ansell’s case, set within gardens of an informal clinic in Piauí, Brazil, the gift was a small satchel of milk. Rima Praspaliauskiene’s was set in a Lithuanian public hospital and the gift was a rich chocolate cake. Aaron, who works and teaches on legal orders, analyzed the exchange as a challenge to hospital norms of equalitarianism. He helped us to see how the give-and-take of milk interrupts the requirements of a deracinated liberal democracy, offering instead the warm sociality of personal affinity. Rima, who focuses on medical care and valuing, used the object of the cake to query the social scientist’s impulse to explain why people do what they do. She shows us how this impulse may rest upon the linearity and equivalence of rational calculation, uncomfortably treating sociality as a commodity.

The juxtaposition of these submissions is emblematic – a case, if you will – of something we have seen throughout this series: the art of ethnographic writing resides in a relation between what is there and what is done with it.

Beginnings

We might trace the origin of the series to a business meeting at the AAAs, when we offered the idea of “the ethnographic case” for a Somatosphere series.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Toxicologist Aims To Label Ethical Standards

Toxicologist Alan Goldberg knows what an industrial pig nursery should look and smell like. So one with no pigs, no slop, and no aroma was certainly surprising. Goldberg toured such a sanitized—and possibly staged—facility in 2006 while he was part of the 15-member Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production, tasked to examine how industry practices impact human health, animal welfare, the environment, and rural communities.

 

The facilities with actual animals in them told a different tale. He recalls one poultry shed in Arkansas that housed 45,000 chickens clustered on a dirt floor that had likely not been cleaned since before the last harvest. Inside, the potent mix of nitrous oxide and ammonia, a byproduct of the chicken feces and urine, made the commissioners’ eyes burn. “The word the Pew Commission used to describe the conditions we saw was ‘inhumane.’ Personally, I would say ‘cruel,’” says Goldberg, a professor of environmental health and engineering at the Bloomberg School of Public Health and the founding director of the school’s Center for Alternatives to Animal Testing.

 

THE PHILOSOPHY BEHIND THE PROJECT IS TO CREATE A TEMPLATE OF ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR THE FOOD INDUSTRY AND BETTER INFORM CONSUMERS ABOUT THEIR CHOICES.

In its 2008 landmark report, the commission condemned the state of industrial production and made sweeping recommendations, including the ban of nontherapeutic anti­biotics, improved management of food animal waste to lessen contamination of waterways, and the phasing out of intensive animal confinement.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Cross Post: Why we should tax meat that contains antibiotics

Alberto Giubilini, University of Oxford

The use of antibiotics in meat production is a major contributor to one of the biggest threats facing human health in the 21st century: antibiotic resistance. Finding a solution to this requires us to start taking responsibility for our actions. While one person eating meat has an imperceptible effect on antibiotic resistance, multiply that by millions of people around the world and you have a global crisis.

One way to tackle this would be to introduce a tax on meat produced with the use of antibiotics, to take account of our moral responsibility for the cost of our actions. And most meat eaters are responsible.

Any meat you buy in your local supermarket has probably been reared with the use of antibiotics. Antibiotics aren’t just used for treating disease but also as a preventative measure, and, outside Europe, to promote animal growth. Estimates of total annual global consumption of antibiotics in animal agriculture vary considerably but could be as much as 240,000 tonnes. And their use is set to increase by 67% from 2010 to 2030.

Perhaps most worryingly, our “last resort” antibiotics are routinely used in animals, with devastating effects. E. coli bacteria resistant to the antibiotic colistin were found in 20% of animals tested during research in China, where it is habitually given to pigs.

The effect of a tax would be twofold: it would discourage consumers from buying this kind of meat, and it would help fund a transition to more sustainable methods of rearing livestock.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Texas Considers Letting Doctors Lie to Patients

by Craig Klugman, Ph.D.

The Texas Senate just passed a new bill (SB 25) that would shield doctors from a lawsuit if a baby is born with a disability even if the doctor knew of the concern and chose not to tell the parents. Opponents of the bill say that it permits doctors to lie to their patients if the doctor believes that knowledge might lead the woman to choose an abortion. The Houston Chronicle reports the bill’s aim is to “chip away at abortion rights.”

The Texas law does not go as far as a 2015 Arizona law that mandated physicians lie to patients by telling them that an abortion can be reversed. The new Texas bill would “allow” doctors to lie to patients and shield them from lawsuit unless the patient could prove gross negligence. The burden is on the patient to prove that the doctor should not have lied.

One of the first rules of professionalism that I teach in undergraduate and medical school bioethics courses is that in general, you never lie to the patient. Telling the truth is a bedrock concept necessary to respect patient autonomy. In order to make decisions, patients need to have knowledge of their condition and their treatment options (risks, benefits, and alternatives).

There are a few circumstances in which lying to patients is ethically acceptable: If the physician has strong reasons to believe that information would push the patient to do harm to him/herself or others, or if the family has requested that a patient not be told information because of cultural practices and the patient has agreed that she/he does not want to know the news.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Assisted Suicide Heads to Colorado

By: Tyler Cosmer

While the outcome of our recent election cycle have represented a country with polarized viewpoints of America’s future policies, one ballot initiative has emerged as a force of consensus. Voters in Colorado overwhelmingly passed Proposition 106 with a clear 64.6% in favor to 35.4% not in favor.[1]  Proposition 106, more commonly known as the “End of Life Options Act,” now gives eligibility for self-administered aid-in-dying medication to terminally ill Coloradans, provided they only have six months or less to live and that they are mentally competent.[2]  Colorado is now the sixth in the United States to sanction physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill citizens, joining Oregon, Washington, California, Montana, and Vermont.[3]  This vote is pivotal for Colorado, marking the latest opportunity for public reflection and debate centered upon how we think about the end of life.

Medical error is the third leading cause of death, behind heart disease and cancer.[11] Opponents to Proposition 106 cite the possible scenario in which an individual is given access to end of life medication, and prematurely ends their life when they might have been able to overcome their prognosis.  Yet, as access to physician-assisted suicide continues to grow, richer data sets regarding impacts of the practice have become available. A 2007 inquiry on how physician-assisted suicide impacts vulnerable populations found no evidence of heightened risks in end of life decision-making in Oregon and in the Netherlands.[12]  

Proposition 106 borrows heavily upon Oregon’s pioneering Death with Dignity Act of 1997.[4]  Similar to Oregon’s Act, Colorado’s version indicates that the request to receive life-ending medication must be the sole initiative of the patient.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Neuroeconomics and Reinforcement Learning: The Concept of Value in the Neuroscience of Morals

By Julia Haas
Julia Haas is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Rhodes College. Her research focuses on theories of valuation and choice.
Imagine a shopper named Barbara in the pasta aisle of her local market.  Just as she reaches for her favorite brand of pasta, she remembers that one of the company’s senior executives made a homophobic statement. What should she do? She likes the brand’s affordability and flavor but prefers to buy from companies that support LGBTQ communities. Barbara then notices that a typically more expensive brand of pasta is on sale and buys a package of that instead. Notably, she doesn’t decide what brand of pasta she will buy in the future.

Barbara’s deliberation reflects a common form of human choice. It also raises a number of questions for moral psychological theories of normative cognition. How do human beings make choices involving normative dimensions? Why do normative principles affect individuals differently at different times? And where does the feeling that so often accompanies normative choices, namely that something is just right or just wrong, come from? In this post, I canvass two novel neuroethical approaches to these questions, and highlight their competing notions of value. I argue that one the most pressing questions theoretical neuroethicists will face in the coming decade concerns how to reconcile the reinforcement learning-based and neuroeconomics-based conceptions of value.
One popular approach to the problem of normative cognition has come from a growing interest in morally-oriented computational neuroscience. In particular, philosophers and cognitive neuroscientists have turned to an area of research known as reinforcement learning (RL), which studies how agents learn through interactions with their environments, to try and understand how moral agents interact in social situations and learn to respond to them accordingly.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.