Bioethics Blogs

Amoral enhancement

Or: A reply to Douglas’ reply to Harris’ reply to Douglas regarding the issue of freedom in cases of biomedical moral enhancement.

Guest Post: Saskia Verkiel

Paper: Amoral Enhancement

Wouldn’t it be awesome if we could just swallow a pill and become better people?

With many aspects of life, growing numbers of people are embracing biomedical interventions to improve physical or cognitive performance and endurance, whether indicated for those purposes or not. Think doping in sports. Think Ritalin in college. Think beta blockers in stage performers. Think modafinil in pilots and surgeons who have to be alert for long stretches of time.

The funny thing is that when it comes to moral enhancement, we tend to think more in terms of its application to others, who are ‘obviously’ not such good people. Swindlers. Rapists. Basically all kinds of performers of crime.

Thomas Douglas was the first to write an analysis specifying when certain kinds of biomedical moral enhancement would be permissible, in 2008, and he realised that it’s important to make this distinction of whom we want the enhancement for. He focused on voluntarily enhancing the self. It’s a jolly nice read.

This paper triggered a cascade of replies.

To be fair, seeing the replies fly back and forth in this debate is not unlike watching a ballgame, albeit more enlightening (or so I think). Compare with Monty Python’s Philosophers’ Football. There’s team “Let’s put it in the drinking water!” (roughly: Oxford) and there’s team “Hold it, hold it…” (captained by John Harris and including yours truly).

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.