In the latest laboratory incident involving potential bioterror pathogens, the U.S. Army’s Dugway Proving Grounds laboratory in Utah accidentally shipped live anthrax to labs in nine states across the U.S. and one in South Korea. News of the mishap has sparked renewed concern about the ability of the U.S. government to adequately safeguard the public from lethal pathogens being studied by the military.
Pentagon assurances that they have secured all the samples and that there is no known risk to the general public do not entirely allay concerns. Mishaps involving loss or release of bacteria, viruses, and toxins reported by U.S. laboratories to the Centers for Disease Control number more than 200 incidents per year. Some of them have harmed researchers and surrounding communities.
Many observers, including scientists and government officials, rightly focus on the inadequacies of lab safety culture. The Dugway anthrax debacle, for example, was the result of lab personnel not properly verifying that the anthrax had been inactivated before shipping it.
However, focusing too much on lab accidents and mishaps obscures the more fundamental issue of why the U.S. is producing these pathogens in the first place.
Research into pathogens like anthrax that are potential biological weapons, known as biodefense, is a multi-billion dollar enterprise. It is limited by the 1972 Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention to scientific, therapeutic, and defensive purposes. This binding international treatyoutlaws any research for offensive military ends. Yet, herein lies the dilemma: Biodefense research includes not only the development of exclusively defensive measures such as vaccines against biological weapons, but also producing bioweapons in order to test the efficacy of countermeasures.
The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.