Tag: strikes

Bioethics Blogs

Harvey and Irma: Bioethics in Natural Disasters

by Craig Klugman, Ph.D.

This is a time of disaster. Last week Hurricane Harvey devastated Southeast Texas, a place where I did my doctoral studies. This week we are awaiting Hurricane Irma, the strongest hurricane to head toward South Florida in 25 years. My family lays in the path of that coming storm. I first became interested in natural disaster in 1989 when my college campus was jolted by a 7.1 earthquake in Northern California.

Bioethics has a role in responding to and preparing for these natural disasters. Most every state, large city and county, and most hospitals have been working on crisis standards of care plans. In 2009 and again in 2012, the Institute of Medicine recommended governments to undertake such planning. Many of us working in bioethics have been involved in these efforts. More specifically, we have been involved with developing ethical frameworks for decision-making, policy-making, and operations during emergency planning.

I worked with Texas during its planning for pandemic flu and for the last 3 years have been part of the ethics subcommittee of Illinois’ workgroup, most recently as chair. Similar groups have produced excellent reports in many places such as Delaware, North Carolina, Michigan, Minnesota, Tennessee, Texas and Toronto. They offer guidance and justification for a varied set of guiding principles and ethical frameworks. All of them hold certain core ideals in common.

First, all of the reports agree that transparency and open communication is essential. Planning needs to involve not only government officials, but also community members.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

A Modest Proposal

FDA should regulate digital games, and potentially other apps, as medical devices.

Why, pray tell?

One doesn’t have to look very hard to find a growing belief (recognition?) that video games are addicting.  CBS has been on the story since at least 2007.  In 2014, “60 minutes” suggested that a violent video game could prompt murder.  Well, they posed it as a question, but to raise it as they did sounds kind of like asking someone, “have you stopped beating your wife?”  And this past April, they did a piece with a former Google employee who suggested that tech companies are designing games, if not apps in general, to draw people into compulsive use.  They revisited the topic, with the same interviewee, in June, using the term “brain hacking.”  Frontline on PBS did a series on the topic in 2010, looking at concerns about internet addiction as well as arguments that some games may hone desirable skills.

Concern about the effect our entertainment media have on us, especially on our kids, is certainly not new.  Remember Tipper Gore, who, among other things, wrote a book about the subject 30 years ago?

The difference comes if our apps and games are not just addictive and self-reinforcing, but if their creators and marketers not only know it but make them that way on purpose.

According to the FDA, a medical device, subject to premarketing and postmarketing regulatory controls by the FDA, is defined in Section 201(h) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as (emphasis mine in what follows):

  • “an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including a component part, or accessory which is:
    • recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States Pharmacopoeia, or any supplement to them,
    • intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, OR
    • intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of any of its primary intended purposes.”

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Charlie Gard: An Ethical Analysis of a Legal non-Problem

(Cross-posted from EJIL: Talk!)

For those with an internet connection and an interest in current affairs, the story of Charlie Gard been hard to avoid recently.  A decent précis is available here; but it’s worth rehearsing.

Shortly after his birth, Charlie’s health began to deteriorate, and he was diagnosed with a terminal and incurable mitochondrial DNA depletion syndrome.  By March 2017, Charlie needed artificial ventilation, and doctors at Great Ormond Street Children’s Hospital (GOSH) applied to the High Court for confirmation that removing that ventilation would be lawful, having judged that it was not in his best interests.  This was contested by his parents, Chris Gard and Connie Yates; the High Court ruled in favour of GOSH.  This was confirmed by the Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights.  During all this time, Charlie remained ventilated.

In the High Court, Mr Justice Francis said that his decision was subject to revision should new evidence emerge favouring continued treatment; in July, Charlie’s parents returned to the High Court, claiming that Charlie might benefit from an experimental treatment being offered by Professor Michio Hirano of Columbia University.  However, as proceedings advanced, it became clear that Hirano’s proposed treatment had never been used on patients like Charlie, that he had neither seen Charlie nor read his notes when he offered the treatment, and that he had a financial interest in that treatment.  The position statement issued by GOSH on the 24th July barely hides the hospital’s legal team’s exasperation.  On the 24th July, Charlie’s parents dropped their request for continued treatment. 

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

More about Charlie Gard

Dr. Robert Truog, the bioethicist and transplant physician who has pushed the envelope on the definition of death, has weighed in on the Charlie Gard case in a “Perspectives” piece that is generally available (i.e., without a subscription) from the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA).   By all means read it.

Dr. Truog approaches the case from the standpoint of limiting medical research—indeed, that’s in the title of his article.  He says the case is about “the best interest of the patient, financial interest, and scientific validity.”  On the first point, he is cautious about the British courts’ assertions that it can assess how much pain and suffering Charlie is experiencing, and whether the courts know this better than the baby’s patients.  This caution seems wise.  As I have reflected further on this case it strikes me that I may be missing a legal distinction between Britain and the US; frankly, I am not well-versed on British law in these cases.  I do tend to think of the Gard case in terms of substituted decision-making in the case of severe or terminal illness.  My thought process runs through the checkpoints.  First, the patient’s wishes are paramount.  In this case, the patient cannot express wishes and may not be able to form them.  In that case, second, a surrogate decision-maker should speak for the patient using “substituted judgment” or “substituted perspective” to express how the patient might have approached the case if able to express wishes.  Here, the parents are available to speak for the patient. 

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Trump is Gross: Taking Political Taste (and Distaste) Seriously

by Shelley Park 

ABSTRACT. This paper advances the somewhat unphilosophical thesis that “Trump is gross” to draw attention to the need to take matters of taste seriously in politics. I begin by exploring the slipperiness of distinctions between aesthetics, epistemology, and ethics, subsequently suggesting that we may need to pivot toward the aesthetic to understand and respond to the historical moment we inhabit. More specifically, I suggest that, in order to understand how Donald Trump was elected President of the United States and in order to stem the damage that preceded this and will ensue from it, we need to understand the power of political taste (and distaste, including disgust) as both a force of resistance and as a force of normalization.

My 5-year-old granddaughter refers to foods, clothes, and people she does not like as “supergross.” It is a verbiage that I have found myself adopting for talking about many things Trumpian, including the man himself. The gaudy, gold-plated everything in Trump Towers; his ill-fitting suits; his poorly executed fake tan and comb-over; his red baseball cap emblazoned with “Make America Great Again;” his creepy way of talking about women (including his own daughters); his racist vitriol about Blacks, Muslims and Mexicans; his blatant over-the-top narcissism; his uncontrolled tantrums; his ridiculous tweets; his outlandish claims; his awkward hand gestures and handshakes; the disquieting ease with which he is seduced by flattery; his embarrassing disregard for facts; his tortured use of language; his rudeness toward other world leaders; the obsequious manner in which other Republicans are treating the man they despised mere months ago; the servility of many Democrats in the face of a military–industrial coup.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Fake News – A Role for Neuroethics?

By Neil Levy
Neil Levy is professor of philosophy at Macquarie University, Sydney, and a senior research fellow at the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford.

Fake news proliferates on the internet, and it sometimes has consequential effects. It may have played a role in the recent election of Donald Trump to the White House, and the Brexit referendum. Democratic governance requires a well-informed populace: fake news seems to threaten the very foundations of democracy.
How should we respond to its challenge? The most common response has been a call for greater media literacy. Fake news often strikes more sophisticated consumers as implausible. But there are reasons to think that the call for greater media literacy is unlikely to succeed as a practical solution to the problem of fake news. For one thing, the response seems to require what it seeks to bring about: a better informed population. For another, while greater sophistication might allow us to identify many instances of fake news, some of it is well crafted enough to fool the most sophisticated (think of the recent report that the FBI was fooled by a possibly fabricated Russian intelligence report).
Moreover, there is evidence that false claims have an effect on our attitudes even when we initially identify the claims as false. Familiarity – processing fluency, in the jargon of psychologists – influences the degree to which we come to regard a claim as plausible. Due to this effect, repeating urban legends in order to debunk them may leave people with a higher degree of belief in the legends than before.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Targeted Killing and Black Boxes

Written By Mitt Regan and Michael Robillard

            Various aspects of the US targeted killing program have attracted considerable attention and some criticism in philosophy and international law. One important aspect of the program that deserves more attention is how targeted killing reflects how the growing number of conflicts involving non-state actors are eroding conventions regarding the use of violence.  Those conventions are based on the paradigm of conflict between states waged by uniformed armed forces on segregated battlefields.  In such conflicts, an individual’s status as a member of the armed forces makes him/her liable to lethal force without examining his/her specific conduct.  Non-state actors, however, do not wear uniforms and seek to be indistinguishable from civilians.  What, then, should be the basis for their liability?

While the traditional paradigm is based on status, it contains implicit assumptions about liable conduct.  These are that: (1) an individual in uniform poses a threat and (2) he voluntarily wears a uniform knowing this.  Voluntarily posing a threat is thus the implicit moral basis for liability on the traditional view of jus in bello. International law stipulates that this condition is met for someone in uniform.  Conflicts with non-state actors, however, require that we make this determination for each individual.  The debate over targeting killing vividly highlights that there is no consensus on what behaviour satisfies this condition aside from overt hostility.  In other words, we lack an accepted convention for determining liability to lethal force absent explicit demonstrations of hostile intent.

Seen in this light, the controversy over the US targeted killing program reflects a debate over what this convention should be.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Donald Trump’s Mental Health (again)

The speculation about Donald Trump’s mental health that was doing the rounds earlier in the year seems to have died down a bit.  That’s to be expected; like it or not, his Presidency is now part of normal life.  But I’ve been lagging in my blogging here, and so it’s only now that I’ve got a moment to mention in passing an op-ed article about Trump in the New Scientist that appeared just after I posted last on the topic.  (February.  I know, I know.)

It’s by Allen Frances, and it takes issue with what he calls “armchair diagnosis” of the president.  He’s right to say that there’s something disquieting about armchair diagnosis: “psychiatric diagnosis is already done far too casually and inaccurately in medical and mental health practice.  Armchair diagnosis further cheapens its currency.”  However, I do wonder whether we ought to pay some attention to whose armchair it is.  Often, it’s an armchair occupied by the genuinely ignorant, or the spiteful.  That’s the internet for you.  Accusing someone of being mentally ill or having a personality disorder on this account may be simply mistaken; or it may be intended as a jibe, the subtext of which is that there’s something shameful about having a mental health problem.  But not every armchair is the same: as Frances’ article admits, a letter with 35 signatories who work within the mental health field appeared in the New York Times.  That letter may be misguided, or ill-motivated.  But it is by people who, presumably, know a thing or two about the topic. 

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Creative Minds: Does Human Immunity Change with the Seasons?

Micaela Martinez

It’s an inescapable conclusion from the book of Ecclesiastes that’s become part of popular culture thanks to folk legends Pete Seeger and The Byrds: “To everything (turn, turn, turn), there is a season.” That’s certainly true of viral outbreaks, from the flu-causing influenza virus peaking each year in the winter to polio outbreaks often rising in the summer. What fascinates Micaela Martinez is, while those seasonal patterns of infection have been recognized for decades, nobody really knows why they occur.

Martinez, an infectious disease ecologist at Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, thinks colder weather conditions and the tendency for humans to stay together indoors in winter surely play a role. But she also thinks an important part of the answer might be found in a place most hadn’t thought to look: seasonal changes in the human immune system. Martinez recently received an NIH Director’s 2016 Early Independence Award to explore fluctuations in the body’s biological rhythms over the course of the year and their potential influence on our health.

Martinez has teamed with researchers at the University of Surrey, England, who specialize in the study of biological rhythms, including sleep. With the help of their state-of-the-art facility, Martinez will study 12 people during each of the four seasons. During each visit, study participants will spend three days in the lab under carefully controlled conditions. Using a specially-designed catheter, Martinez will collect blood samples each hour, even while participants are asleep. With those blood samples in hand, Martinez will look for telltale changes in hormone levels, gene expression, and immune activity that predictably follow with the seasons.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

Court Strikes Down Florida Law Barring Doctors From Discussing Guns With Patients

A federal appeals court says doctors in Florida must be allowed to discuss guns with their patients, striking down portions of a Florida law that restricts what physicians can say to patients about firearm ownership

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.