Tag: practice

Bioethics News

Few Americans Plan For End-of-Life Decisions, Even If They Are Sick

Michael S. Dauber, MA, GBI Visiting Scholar

Many moral dilemmas faced by clinicians, patients, and their families arise when individuals have not made plans for the end of their lives or discussed their wishes with their loved ones. To prevent and mitigate these issues, ethicists have suggested for decades that individuals should complete documents such as advanced directives like living wills (legal documents that indicate one’s wishes for interventions like intubation and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)), and to name a healthcare proxy (an individual to make decisions on one’s behalf in the event one becomes unable). Such measures tend to make it easier for individuals to address moral dilemmas in practice and to determine the ethically appropriate surrogate decision maker for a patient.

According to a recent study published in Health Affairs, few Americans have taken either of these measures. Researchers compiled results from over 150 studies of end-of-life planning measures and determined that only 36.7 percent of those surveyed had completed some sort of advanced directive, with 29.3 percent of those individuals completing living wills and 33 percent empowering a healthcare proxy. The study also found that 42 percent of individuals aged 65 or older had completed some sort of advanced directive, as opposed to 32 percent of individuals younger than 65.

There are several reasons why individuals may be hesitant to complete healthcare proxies. Many young people may feel they can put off decisions about care at the end of their lives because such matters are comparatively unlikely to occur in the short term.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Why vegetarians should be prepared to bend their own rules

Alberto Giubilini
Republished from Aeon Magazine

It’s a common enough scenario. A vegetarian has been invited to a friend’s place for dinner. The host forgets that the guest is a vegetarian, and places a pork chop in front of her. What is she to do? Probably her initial feelings will be disgust and repulsion. Vegetarians often develop these sorts of attitudes towards meat-based food, making it easier for them to be absolutists about shunning meat.

Suppose, though, that the vegetarian overcomes her feelings of distaste, and decides to eat the chop, perhaps out of politeness to her host. Has she done something morally reprehensible? Chances are that what she has been served won’t be the kind of humanely raised meat that some (but not all) ethical vegetarians find permissible to consume. More likely, it would be the product of cruel, intensive factory farming. Eating the meat under these circumstances couldn’t then be an act of what the philosopher Jeff McMahan calls ‘benign carnivorism’. Would the vegetarian guest have done something wrong by breaking her own moral code?

Most vegetarians are concerned about animal suffering caused by meat consumption, or about the impact of factory farming on the environment. For simplicity’s sake, I will consider only the case of animal suffering, but the same argument could be applied to the other bad consequences of today’s practices of factory farming, including, for example, greenhouse gas emissions, inefficient use of land, and use of pesticides, fertiliser, fuel, feed and water, as well as the use of antibiotics causing antibiotic resistance in livestock’s bacteria which is then passed on to humans.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

In the Journals – July 2017 by Danya Glabau

American Quarterly

Regina Kunzel

Among the central themes of the eclectic field of mad studies is a critique of psychiatric authority. Activists and academics, from a range of positions and perspectives, have questioned psychiatry’s normalizing impulses and have privileged mad-identified knowledges over expert ones. One of the most successful assaults on psychiatric authority was launched by gay activists in the 1960s and early 1970s, resulting in the removal of homosexuality from the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1973. But if that event marked an inspirational victory against psychiatric power, it was also, as Robert McRuer notes, “a distancing from disability.”1Revisiting this history through analytic lenses offered by disability and mad studies defamiliarizes familiar historical narratives and unsettles the critique of psychiatric authority, especially when countered by claims to health.

 

Conflicts over the value, meaning, and efficacy of vaccination as a preventive practice suggest that vaccination resistance stages disagreement within modern biological citizenship. This paper explores how immunity circulates in both vaccination controversy and biopolitical philosophies. Two positions—one characterized by somatic individualism, flexible bodies, reflexive approaches to knowledge, and the idea of the immune system as “the essential relation the body has with its vulnerability,” and another characterized by the immunitary paradigm, biosecurity, trust in expert systems, and vaccination—emerge. Understanding that oppositional relation can reframe public understanding of vaccine skepticism and public health responses to it.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

How Much Should Your Boss and the U.S. Department of Labor Know About Your Opioid Prescription History?

As the
price of health care and uncertainty about health insurance coverage increases,
employers are taking more of an interest in their employees’ health. Indeed,
this is not a new trend as the United States health insurance system has been
employment-based since its creation. However, this trend may seem more
justifiable when the federal government also takes an interest in employees’
health.  From a public health
perspective, monitoring a society’s health is very important but it must be
balanced against the individual’s privacy interest as well as the harms and
benefits of that monitoring. There is also the issue of who/what is the most
appropriate entity to be doing the monitoring.

On June
27, 2017,
the
United States Department of Labor announced
it
will officially be
monitoring
use of opioid prescriptions by workers
under the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, which is the law surrounding the worker’s
compensation system.  The announcement
expressed a safety concern based on overdoses and addiction of opioids in the
midst of our current opioid crisis.

When an
employee files a worker’s compensation claim,
the
employer must be notified
and the employer
has access to the health records included in that claim
.
The employer’s access to health records is limited to whatever is included in
the claim and is justified based on the premise that the employer has an
interest in the worker’s compensation claim. However, this new monitoring
system means that an employer will now have access to its employees’ opioid
prescription history, as this is information the U.S. Department of Labor will
be monitoring as part of the worker’s compensation process.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

How Much Should Your Boss and the U.S. Department of Labor Know About Your Opioid Prescription History?

As the
price of health care and uncertainty about health insurance coverage increases,
employers are taking more of an interest in their employees’ health. Indeed,
this is not a new trend as the United States health insurance system has been
employment-based since its creation. However, this trend may seem more
justifiable when the federal government also takes an interest in employees’
health.  From a public health
perspective, monitoring a society’s health is very important but it must be
balanced against the individual’s privacy interest as well as the harms and
benefits of that monitoring. There is also the issue of who/what is the most
appropriate entity to be doing the monitoring.

On June
27, 2017,
the
United States Department of Labor announced
it
will officially be
monitoring
use of opioid prescriptions by workers
under the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, which is the law surrounding the worker’s
compensation system.  The announcement
expressed a safety concern based on overdoses and addiction of opioids in the
midst of our current opioid crisis.

When an
employee files a worker’s compensation claim,
the
employer must be notified
and the employer
has access to the health records included in that claim
.
The employer’s access to health records is limited to whatever is included in
the claim and is justified based on the premise that the employer has an
interest in the worker’s compensation claim. However, this new monitoring
system means that an employer will now have access to its employees’ opioid
prescription history, as this is information the U.S. Department of Labor will
be monitoring as part of the worker’s compensation process.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

Should Euthanasia Be Considered Iatrogenic?

August 3, 2017

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Abstract

As more countries adopt laws and regulations concerning euthanasia, pediatric euthanasia has become an important topic of discussion. Conceptions of what constitutes harm to patients are fluid and highly dependent on a myriad of factors including, but not limited to, health care ethics, family values, and cultural context. Euthanasia could be viewed as iatrogenic insofar as it results in an outcome (death) that some might consider inherently negative. However, this perspective fails to acknowledge that death, the outcome of euthanasia, is not an inadvertent or preventable complication but rather the goal of the medical intervention. Conversely, the refusal to engage in the practice of euthanasia might be conceived as iatrogenic insofar as it might inadvertently prolong patient suffering. This article will explore cultural and social factors informing families’, health care professionals’, and society’s views on pediatric euthanasia in selected countries.

… Read More

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AMA Journal of Ethics

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The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

First US-Based Group to Edit Human Embryos Brings Practice Closer to Clinic

The ethical and practical debates over using the DNA-editing method CRISPR to alter human embryos just got less hypothetical. A week after the news leaked out, a US-based team has published the first rigorous demonstration that CRISPR can efficiently repair a gene defect in human embryos without introducing new mutations elsewhere. With comments from our Jeffrey Kahn

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

The Charlie Gard case. An ultimate dispassionate ethical reflexion

It is dangerous to exclude ethical judgment from medical decisions in which death is knocking at the door of life

In medical cases in which death comes knocking at the door of life, circumstances arise that are not easy to judge and even less easy to resolve. Such cases can be paradigmatic, like that of Charlie Gard. I believe, therefore, that the first thing we must do is to treat all parties with respect and courtesy, especially those who most suffer for being the protagonists of the events, in this instance the sick child and his parents.

From an ethical point of view, there are a number of aspects that should be evaluated. If I forget one, it is not with the intention Great Ormond Street Hospital doctors. Aspects that should be evaluatedof ignoring it, but because of my own limitations.

Great Ormond Street Hospital (NHS) doctors

To begin with, it should be said that Great Ormond Street Hospital (GOSH) is a leading children’s hospital, one of the most prestigious in the United Kingdom, so we should assume that its medical team — and in all likelihood those who took care of Charlie — are highly professional.

Gosh pleaded for Charlie to be taken off the mechanical ventilation

In April this year, when Mr Justice Francis issued his first verdict, the team from the London hospital pleaded for Charlie to be taken off the mechanical ventilation keeping him alive. This meant the immediate death of the child.

Around the same time, a distinguished American doctor, Dr Michio Hirano, offered Charlie’s parents the possibility of treating the baby with a novel therapy, which, it seems, had shown some beneficial effect in another American child who had a disease similar to that of Charlie’s (Child tried by the experimental treatment Charlie Gard’s) In my opinion this offer ethically conditioned the decision taken by the doctors at GOSH.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Web Round Up: Time to Chill? Egg Freezing and Beyond by Moira Kyweluk

A focus on age-related fertility decline, and exploration of ways to expand the timeline and options for biological parenthood have been consistent cultural and web-wide fixations. The $3 billion United States fertility industry was in the headlines once again this month including coverage of the launch of Future Family, a service offering  a “fertility age test” to women and negotiated-rate infertility medical care, alongside newly published research on ovarian tissue preservation, an alternative to oocyte cryopreservation or “egg freezing”, both procedures aimed at potentially extending a woman’s fertility window.

In the wake of findings presented in July 2017 at the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology conference in Geneva, Switzerland by Marcia Inhorn, Professor of Anthropology and International Affairs at Yale University, popular media headlines blared:  “Why are women freezing their eggs? Because of the lack of eligible men”  and “Women who freeze their eggs aren’t doing it for career reasons.” The study analyzed interviews from 150 women in their late 30s and early 40s who opted for egg freezing in Israel and the United States. Results “show that women were not intentionally postponing childbearing for educational or career reasons, as is often assumed in media coverage of this phenomenon, but rather preserving their remaining fertility because they did not have partners to create a family with. The researchers conclude that women see egg freezing as ‘a technological concession to the man deficit’, using it to ‘buy time’ while continuing their search for a suitable partner to father their children.”

The American Society of Reproductive Medicine, the regulatory board that governs the safe and ethical use of fertility technologies, reclassified egg-freezing technology from “experimental” to standard-of-care in 2012.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

Criminal Law and Neuroscience: Hope or Hype?

August 1, 2017

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Most commonly, many thought that traditional notions of criminal responsibility would be undermined for various reasons, such as demonstrating that people really cannot control themselves as well as we believe, or as indicating that more action was automatic, thoughtless and non-rational than we think. Most radically, the neuroexuberants argued that neuroscience shows that no one is really responsible because we are not agents; rather, we are victims of neuronal circumstances that mechanistically produce our epiphenomenal thoughts and our bodily movements. Similar claims were made when the genome was cracked. The age of cognitive, affective, and social neuroscience (behavioral neuroscience)—the neurosciences most relevant to law—is almost two decades old. What have we learned that is legally relevant and how has it transformed criminal law doctrine and practice?

Despite the astonishing advances in neuroscience, most of what we know is not legally relevant, has not transformed doctrine in the slightest and has had scant influence on practice except in death penalty proceedings. The reasons are conceptual, scientific, and practical. The first and most basic conceptual problem is that we have no idea how the brain enables the mind and action, although we know that it does. If your brain is dead, you have no mental states and do not act. The brain/mind/action connection is one of the hardest problems in science and neuroscience is not about to crack it anytime soon, if ever.

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Neuroethics Blog

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The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.