Tag: power

Bioethics Blogs

Into the Gray Zone: A Neuroscientist Explores the Border Between Life and Death

Coming soon from Scribner is Adrian Owen’s new book Into the Gray Zone. The book reviews Owen’s work exploring the “gray zone” between full consciousness and brain death. 


People in this “middle place” have sustained traumatic brain injuries or are the victims of stroke or degenerative diseases, such as Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s. Many are oblivious to the outside world, and their doctors believe they are incapable of thought. But a sizeable number are experiencing something different: intact minds adrift deep within damaged brains and bodies. 


Into the Gray Zone asks some tough and terrifying questions, such as: 

  • What is life like for these patients? 
  • What can their families and friends do to help them? 
  • What are the ethical implications for religious organizations, politicians, the Right to Die movement, and even insurers? 
  • In defining what a life worth living is, are we too concerned with the physical and not giving enough emphasis to the power of thought? 
  • What, truly, defines a satisfying life?

Source: bioethics.net, a blog maintained by the editorial staff of The American Journal of Bioethics.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Global Health Policy: Trump and the Reinstatement of the Global Gag Rule

By: Jorge Luis Rivera-Agosto

On January 23, 2017, President Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum reinstating the so-called Mexico City Policy. The Memorandum conditions U.S. global health and family planning assistance to a strict rule that precludes foreign non-governmental organizations (also known as “NGOs”) from promoting or performing abortion as a method of family planning. Also known as the “global gag rule,” this policy represents a blow specifically to women’s health worldwide. Thanks to this new action, it will become harder, like in past years when it was in effect, to have resources to support family planning and reproductive health services, such as “family counseling, contraceptive commodities, condoms, and reproductive cancer screenings.” Even though the U.S. government won’t retract from the Memoranda until this Administration ceases, global efforts should be made to ameliorate the negative effects the new policy will cause.

The Mexico City Policy was first enacted by President Reagan in 1984 – and at the time, it represented an expansion of existing legislative restrictions of the use of U.S. funds for abortions internationally. It was then rescinded by President Clinton in 1991; reinstated by President Bush in 2001; rescinded by President Obama in 2009; and reinstated and expanded by President Trump in 2017. The policy requires foreign NGOs “to certify that they will not perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning, using funds from any source (including non-U.S. funds), as a condition for receiving U.S. government global family planning assistance and any other U.S. global health assistance.” The reason given to enact such policy was that the U.S.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Kathy Greenlee’s Reflections on Paths to Person-Centered Planning

Challenging Us to See the Whole Person at All Stages of Life

Kathy Greenlee, VP for Aging and Health Policy

The Center for Practical Bioethics hosted the Joan Berkeley symposium on Thursday, April 6. The title for the day was “Paths to Person-Centered Planning.” In planning the event, my objective was to focus on tools and techniques grounded in a disability policy perspective that could benefit healthcare professionals and bioethicists. The day brought articulate and engaged speakers, raised new questions, introduced different language, and ultimately affirmed the strength of a multi-disciplinary approach to supporting people and their families as they face serious illness and end of life. 

Four distinct concepts emerged:
1) the perspective of the person as patient,
2) similarities and differences between shared decision-making and supported decision-making, 
3) the balance between what is “important to” a person and “important for” a person, and
4) the need to see a patient within the context of their family, however defined.

Person-Centered Communication

The panelists who opened the day demonstrated the importance of listening to people and the first speaker stole the show. 
Cathy Enfield, member of Self-Advocates Becoming Empowered (SABE), is an articulate adult woman with a developmental disability. She uses an iPad for communication assistance. She gave a first-person account of having healthcare providers look past her and talk directly to her caregiver. 
To communicate, Cathy needs support. Yet, public policies ranging from transportation to healthcare create barriers and financial disincentives that require her to be accompanied by someone to assist. Cathy’s comments were so compelling one of the medical educators in the audience intends to make them required reading for his first-year medical students.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Luhrmann and Marrow’s Our Most Troubling Madness by Murphy Halliburton

Our Most Troubling Madness: Case Studies in Schizophrenia Across Cultures

T.M. Luhrmann and Jocelyn Marrow, editors

University of California Press, 2016, 304 pages

 

A key premise of this volume of ethnographic case studies is that schizophrenia, or the various conditions we label as schizophrenia and related psychoses, varies in crucial ways in terms of experience, prognosis and outcome in different sociocultural contexts. Tanya Luhrmann’s introduction to the volume, which features twelve articles presenting twelve individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia (including three cases presented by Luhrmann), casts doubt on the biomedical model of schizophrenia, or at least the strong biomedical model where an individual’s biology is the determining factor in the pathogenesis of schizophrenia. Support for this critique comes from within the fields of psychiatry, psychology and related disciplines, and not just from anthropology, the disciplinary home base of many of the authors in this compilation. This supports the volume’s efforts to speak to an audience beyond the contributors’ own disciplines and “serve as a positive catalyst for change” in how we treat psychosis, especially in European and North American settings (5).

The introduction also briefly traces the history of theories of schizophrenia in psychiatry and anthropology, including moments when the two fields overlapped as with Gregory Bateson’s theory that schizophrenia results from a “double bind” that develops in a person’s psyche from conflicting social cues. This theory, put forth by an anthropologist, had a significant place in psychiatrists’ understanding of pathogenesis until the rise of the medical model deflected the blame from families toward “random bad genetic luck” (16).

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Mari Mikkola, The Wrongs of Injustice: Dehumanization and its Role in Feminist Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 2016

Mari Mikkola identifies three primary forms of social injustice—oppression, domination, and discrimination—and asks what makes them wrong. She argues that feminist philosophy has thus far focused heavily on gender as a lens or anchor through which to understand and respond to injustice. In Mikkola’s view, this orientation around gender (and what she terms “the gender controversy”) is limiting feminist philosophers’ theoretical engagement with the roots of injustice. To remedy this problem, she builds a case for moving toward a more broadly humanist conception of injustice. The humanist feminism that she puts forth centers dehumanization as a way to theorize injustice; dehumanization, for Mikkola, is the very foundation of injustice.

Following an introductory chapter that frames Mikkola’s approach and argument, the book is divided into two parts. The first part of the book is dedicated to articulating Mikkola’s argument for moving beyond the “gender controversy” in feminist philosophy. She explains that the perspectives debated in the gender controversy produce two kinds of puzzles: one semantic, the other ontological. The semantic puzzle asks: “Given that ordinary language users tend not to distinguish sex and gender (treating ‘woman’ largely as a sex term, or a mixture of social and biological features), what precisely are feminists talking about when they talk about ‘women’? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions that the concept woman encodes, if any such conditions exist to begin with?” (28). The ontological puzzle, by contrast, is concerned with: “How should we understand the category of women that is meant to undergird feminist political solidarity, if there are no necessary and sufficient conceptual conditions underlying our gender talk?

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Rape, disability, and gender: A response to McMahan and Singer’s op-ed on the Anna Stubblefield case

Unfortunately, there have been numerous cases of sexual
harassment and sexual assault in academia and particularly in more
male-dominated fields, including my home field of philosophy. In these cases,
professors use their position of prestige and power to sexually harass and
abuse their students. UC Berkeley philosophy professor John
Searle
is just the most recent example. To my knowledge, all of these cases
have involved male professors victimizing female students. The lone exception
is Anna
Stubblefield
, a former professor of philosophy at Rutgers. Here is a
summary of her case from Current Affairs

At issue is the case of Anna
Stubblefield, a Rutgers University philosophy professor convicted of sexually
assaulting her mentally disabled pupil, and sentenced to 12 years in prison.
The case is, to say the least, extremely unusual. The student, D.J., was a
severely impaired 30 year old man with cerebal palsy, who had never spoken a
word in his life and communicated through “screams” and “chirps.” Stubblefield
acted as his personal tutor, using a discredited pseudoscientific technique to
elicit what she insisted were complex communications from D.J. Eventually,
based on what she believed D.J. wanted, Stubblefield began engaging in sex acts
with him, having become romantically attracted to him over the course of her
time assisting him.  

Stubblefield’s case is not only different because she is a
woman and her victim is a man, but also because she is one of the few
professors to go through the legal system and be convicted.

There are
many complexities to Stubblefield’s case and I don’t have the space to address
them all here.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

The ethnographic case: series conclusion by Emily Yates-Doerr

Editors note: This entry concludes the series “The Ethnographic Case” which ran every other Monday between June 2015 and July 2016. The bookCase, which holds 27 cases, can be accessed here.

One day, early on in the series, we received two submissions. Their similar anatomy was striking. Each featured a medical waiting room. Someone entered the space with a gift for the clinical personnel, the gift was accepted, and something shifted in the resulting care.

In Aaron Ansell’s case, set within gardens of an informal clinic in Piauí, Brazil, the gift was a small satchel of milk. Rima Praspaliauskiene’s was set in a Lithuanian public hospital and the gift was a rich chocolate cake. Aaron, who works and teaches on legal orders, analyzed the exchange as a challenge to hospital norms of equalitarianism. He helped us to see how the give-and-take of milk interrupts the requirements of a deracinated liberal democracy, offering instead the warm sociality of personal affinity. Rima, who focuses on medical care and valuing, used the object of the cake to query the social scientist’s impulse to explain why people do what they do. She shows us how this impulse may rest upon the linearity and equivalence of rational calculation, uncomfortably treating sociality as a commodity.

The juxtaposition of these submissions is emblematic – a case, if you will – of something we have seen throughout this series: the art of ethnographic writing resides in a relation between what is there and what is done with it.

Beginnings

We might trace the origin of the series to a business meeting at the AAAs, when we offered the idea of “the ethnographic case” for a Somatosphere series.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

New Year resolutions and tripartite human nature

Written by Charles Foster

‘I do not understand my own actions’, grumbled St. Paul. ‘For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate….I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do….’1

That’s a fair summary of the evidence about the fate of New Year’s resolutions. The University of Hertfordshire psychologist, Richard Wiseman, found that only 10% of New Year’s resolutions succeed. Most of them are abandoned by 23 January.

http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/features/why-we-make-and-break-our-new-years-resolutions-and-how-to-stick-to-them-9951829.html

When we fail in our resolutions, we rebuke ourselves in very Pauline language.2, 3, 4 The higher parts of ourselves, we say, are in a battle against the lower parts. We even give Pauline names to the parties in the battle: he distinguished clearly between ‘…spirit and soul and body…’5 So do we. ‘The spirit was willing’, we complain, after a losing battle with the body over the last of the mince pies, ‘but the flesh was weak’. These self-rebukes have distinct normative moral colour: we are not merely regretting the consequences of our failure.

This tripartite division of human nature was Christian orthodoxy until Augustine. He abandoned it, substituting a bipartite model (body and soul) because he wanted to insist on human fallenness, and the presence of a spirit (which presumably had a divine origin6) made it harder to emphasize human depravity. The Roman Catholic church has long been in thrall to Augustine: so, in this respect at least, were the Refomers (notably Calvin, and with the honourable exception of Luther).

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

BioethicsTV: Aggressive Treatment Chosen for Patients at the End of Life

by Craig Klugman, Ph.D.

This week’s Thursday night medical TV was all about end of life decision-making and delved into the questions of how much aggressive treatment is too much, what happens when physicians lose clinical distance, and who makes decisions for patients.

On Chicago Med (Season 2, Episode 18), a patient with Alzheimer’s is admitted to the ED with a fever and chills. She has pneumonia and has for several days, only being sent to the hospital that day by her long-term care facility. The patient is Dr. Bella Rowen, Halstead’s former mentor and administrator Goodwin’s former colleague (from her nursing days). As the patient is brought in, a nurse says “No advance directive, no family, and the surrogate just passed away, so it’s going to be our call.” Halstead is emotionally invested in his mentor and takes over decision-making for her care. She is frail and does not remember him. When Rowen codes, Halstead pushes CPR even though, as his colleagues tell him, he will break all of her ribs and only cause suffering. He resuscitates and intubates her. We are told that she will never get off the vent. When her kidneys fail, he orders dialysis. Goodwin talks to him and says that such measures will lead Rowen to live the rest of her days on machines, bedridden with sores, and open to infections. Goodwin tells Halstead that the woman he knew was gone and forcing this patient to live would not bring his mentor back.

One of the major ethical issues raised in this case is whether, in fact, Halstead should have been making decisions for the patient.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

Tech Giants Grapple with the Ethical Concerns Raised by the AI Boom

With great power comes great responsibility—and artificial-intelligence technology is getting much more powerful. Companies in the vanguard of developing and deploying machine learning and AI are now starting to talk openly about ethical challenges raised by their increasingly smart creations

Source: Bioethics Bulletin by the Berman Institute of Bioethics.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.