Tag: life sciences

Bioethics Blogs

An Animal Bioethicist in Seattle

Andrew Fenton voices concerns about invisible unnecessary harm to non-human animals and a cost of ethical inconsistency.

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I recently had the pleasure of attending the 10th World Congress on Alternatives and Animal Use in the Life Sciences in Seattle, Washington. It was an interdisciplinary affair, with lots of scientists as well as philosophers, bioethicists, and representatives from various animal advocacy groups. The sessions I attended were interesting and it was great to see so many, involved in the use, care, or defense of animals used in science under one roof (and engaging each other!). It’s a hazard of our vocation as bioethicists to keep an eye out for incongruities. One jumped out at me. Let me set it up so that it jumps out at you too.

The World Congress, which began to meet way back in 1993 in Baltimore, Maryland, is geared toward the “3Rs” of animal research and facilitates discussions of breakthroughs, advances, failures of this research, as well as of research ethics. What are the 3Rs? In order of appearance in popular animal ethics framework (found in Russell and Burch’s 1959 book, The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique), they are: Replacement, Reduction, and Refinement. Replacement concerns replacing sentient animals currently used in particular areas of testing or research with either animals who are less vulnerable to harm or non-sentient animals (such as insects) or models (such as tissue cultures or computer simulations). Reduction concerns reducing the number of sentient animals used in particular studies or protocols. Refinement concerns minimizing or eliminating scientifically unnecessary or unavoidable distress in the sentient animals used in testing or research.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Julia Powles on ‘The Week in Health Law’ Podcast

By Nicolas Terry and Frank Pasquale Subscribe to TWIHL here! We talk with legal scholar and journalist Dr. Julia Powles. At Cambridge, Julia was associated with the Centre for Law, Medicine and Life Sciences and Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law, and a Research Associate … Continue reading

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

In the Journals – July 2017 by Danya Glabau

American Quarterly

Regina Kunzel

Among the central themes of the eclectic field of mad studies is a critique of psychiatric authority. Activists and academics, from a range of positions and perspectives, have questioned psychiatry’s normalizing impulses and have privileged mad-identified knowledges over expert ones. One of the most successful assaults on psychiatric authority was launched by gay activists in the 1960s and early 1970s, resulting in the removal of homosexuality from the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1973. But if that event marked an inspirational victory against psychiatric power, it was also, as Robert McRuer notes, “a distancing from disability.”1Revisiting this history through analytic lenses offered by disability and mad studies defamiliarizes familiar historical narratives and unsettles the critique of psychiatric authority, especially when countered by claims to health.

 

Conflicts over the value, meaning, and efficacy of vaccination as a preventive practice suggest that vaccination resistance stages disagreement within modern biological citizenship. This paper explores how immunity circulates in both vaccination controversy and biopolitical philosophies. Two positions—one characterized by somatic individualism, flexible bodies, reflexive approaches to knowledge, and the idea of the immune system as “the essential relation the body has with its vulnerability,” and another characterized by the immunitary paradigm, biosecurity, trust in expert systems, and vaccination—emerge. Understanding that oppositional relation can reframe public understanding of vaccine skepticism and public health responses to it.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

The Charlie Gard case. An ultimate dispassionate ethical reflexion

It is dangerous to exclude ethical judgment from medical decisions in which death is knocking at the door of life

In medical cases in which death comes knocking at the door of life, circumstances arise that are not easy to judge and even less easy to resolve. Such cases can be paradigmatic, like that of Charlie Gard. I believe, therefore, that the first thing we must do is to treat all parties with respect and courtesy, especially those who most suffer for being the protagonists of the events, in this instance the sick child and his parents.

From an ethical point of view, there are a number of aspects that should be evaluated. If I forget one, it is not with the intention Great Ormond Street Hospital doctors. Aspects that should be evaluatedof ignoring it, but because of my own limitations.

Great Ormond Street Hospital (NHS) doctors

To begin with, it should be said that Great Ormond Street Hospital (GOSH) is a leading children’s hospital, one of the most prestigious in the United Kingdom, so we should assume that its medical team — and in all likelihood those who took care of Charlie — are highly professional.

Gosh pleaded for Charlie to be taken off the mechanical ventilation

In April this year, when Mr Justice Francis issued his first verdict, the team from the London hospital pleaded for Charlie to be taken off the mechanical ventilation keeping him alive. This meant the immediate death of the child.

Around the same time, a distinguished American doctor, Dr Michio Hirano, offered Charlie’s parents the possibility of treating the baby with a novel therapy, which, it seems, had shown some beneficial effect in another American child who had a disease similar to that of Charlie’s (Child tried by the experimental treatment Charlie Gard’s) In my opinion this offer ethically conditioned the decision taken by the doctors at GOSH.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

Organ donation for transplantation in children with cardiac arrest and dying person dignity

Premortem interventions before donation in circulatory arrest in children could have objective ethical problems 

(See our special reports about criterion of death and organs transplantation HERE)

Up until a few years ago, performing medical interventions in end-of-life situations had been proposed as actions centered on the best interests of the dying patient.

The growing demand for organs for transplantation has created a need to increase the number of organ donors (see HERE).

Since the number of brain-dead donors is currently insufficient to meet the needs of patients on the transplant waiting list, medical procedures have been developed in the last decade aimed at ensuring that the organs from donors in cardiac arrest are also suitable for successful solid organ transplantation (see HERE our article about the relation between excellent figures of organ donation and organ donors with cardiac arrest in Spain).

Nevertheless, in order to achieve sufficient organ viability in donors with cardiac arrest, a series of medical procedures need to be performed that have the main aim of reducing the warm ischaemia time to which these organs are subjected, in order to increase the chances of post-transplant success.

An article has recently been published in the Journal of Medical Ethics (1“Premortem interventions in dying children to optimise organ donation: an ethical analysis”, whose authors Joe Brierley and David Shaw analyze the ethical and legal aspects of premortem interventions performed in dying children, aimed at optimizing organ donation for transplantation following cardiac arrest.

Premortem interventions in pediatric patients for organ donation from an ethical perspective

This article examines the legislative aspects (specific to the United Kingdom), and also gives a description and analysis of the elements that, from an ethical perspective, might support – or contradict – the performance of premortem interventions in pediatric patients for organ donation.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

Charlie Gard, the sick baby hospital doctors want to disconnect. Our medical and ethical assessement

He and his parents await the Judge’s decision regarding the possibility of withdrawing or not the life support who keep him alive and the possibility of receiving an experimental treatment in the United States

Medical aspects

Charlie was born on 4 August 2016. In October the same year, he was admitted to Great Osmond Street Hospital (GOSH-NHS) in London, and diagnosed with a disease that affects mitochondrial function, called mitochondrial DNA depletion syndrome (MDDS). This means that he cannot obtain sufficient energy for his muscles, kidneys, brain and other organs, which causes progressive muscle weakness and brain damage.

Although there seemed to be no specific treatment for the mitochondrial abnormality at that time, in January 2017, his mother became aware of an experimental treatment using nucleosides that was being evaluated in the United States in patients with a disease similar to Charlie’s. Consequently, his parents assessed the possibility of taking him to the US for treatment because, according to them, it might improve their son’s health by at least 10%.

At the same time, British newspaper “The Guardian” announced that the US Hospital that had the medication offered to ship it so that Charlie could be treated immediately, but GOSH (NHS hospital) disagreed, proposing instead to withdraw the child’s respiratory support.

In effect, New York-Presbyterian Hospital and Irving Medical Center, also in New York, published a statement saying that they were willing to admit and clinically evaluate Charlie, as they had FDA approval for the use of an experimental treatment using nucleosides.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Transferring Embryos with Genetic Anomalies

Jackie Leach Scully argues that respect for equality and diversity, and not just respect for the parental autonomy and the welfare of the future child, should inform policies governing the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis.

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The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine recently published an Opinion on “Transferring embryos with genetic anomalies detected in preimplantation testing.” The Opinion aims to help providers deal with the rare but ethically difficult situation when prospective parents want to transfer embryos with a known genetic anomaly that is linked to a serious health-affecting disorder.

Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is typically used by couples to avoid transferring a genetic anomaly to their children. Using PGD to ensure the transfer of a genetic anomaly, rather than avoid it, seems deeply counter-intuitive. Yet, there are several scenarios where this might happen. For example, this might be a reasonable option when the only transferable embryos carry the genetic anomaly, or when the embryos carry a different, but potentially just as serious, genetic variation.

The most problematic cases, however, occur when prospective parents express an actual preference for children with ‘their’ genetic condition – an anomalous condition that others perceive in negative terms. It’s an uncommon situation, but despite its rarity steps have been taken to block attempts by prospective parents to ‘choose disability’, such as the UK’s legislation on reproductive medicine. The legislation prohibits the use of an embryo (or gamete, in the case of egg and sperm donation) that has a genetic anomaly “involving a significant risk” of “a serious physical or mental disability, serious illness, or a serious medical condition” unless there are no other unaffected embryos or gametes that could be used instead.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Making the theoretical practical: Engaging undergraduate students in research methods by Hannah Mohammad

I am currently an undergraduate student in the Department of Global Health & Social Medicine at King’s College London. The Department’s UG program offers students the opportunity to study social aspects of health and medicine in a multi-disciplinary context with close collaboration between the social sciences, life sciences and biomedicine. In addition, a great emphasis is put on methods training to equip students to carry out their own empirical research projects.

Already in first year, the Research Practice and Design Studio course taught us theories and practices required for qualitative and quantitative research. However, in our undergraduate bubble, these late Tuesday afternoon sessions seemed somewhat distant from conducting actual research. In order to address this perceived disconnect, our course instructor, Dr Laurie Corna decided to adopt a problem-based learning approach that allowed us students to be positioned as emerging researchers whilst learning theoretically about a range of issues central to quantitative and qualitative research designs.

A new research methods course was designed around a series of case-based learning activities that culminated in students conducting their own mixed-methods research. Students’ assignments for the course involved working in teams of two on applying and executing various aspects of the research process in relation to the predefined topic “Physical activity in the city of London”.[1] That is, we learned how to articulate research questions, identify ethical problems, write a research proposal and develop related interview topic guides as well as survey questionnaires. Once we had conducted our research, we were tasked to present our findings in the form of a poster during a “Research Showcase” and create a final report on the research project.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

The biological status of the early human embryo. When does human life begins?

“Those who argue that that embryo can be destroyed with impunity will have to prove that this newly created life is not human. And no-one, to the best of our knowledge, has yet been able to do so.”

Introduction

In order to determine the nature of the human embryo, we need to know its biological, anthropological, philosophical, and even its legal reality. In our opinion, however, the anthropological, philosophical and legal reality of the embryo — the basis of its human rights — must be built upon its biological reality (see also HERE).

Consequently, one of the most widely debated topics in the field of bioethics is to determine when human life begins, and particularly to define the biological status of the human embryo, particularly the early embryo, i.e. from impregnation of the egg by the sperm until its implantation in the maternal endometrium.

Irrespective of this, though, this need to define when human life begins is also due to the fact that during the early stages of human life — approximately during its first 14 days — this young embryo is subject to extensive and diverse threats that, in many cases, lead to its destruction (see HERE).

These threats affect embryos created naturally, mainly through the use of drugs or technical procedures used in the control of human fertility that act via an anti-implantation mechanism, especially intrauterine devices (as DIU); this is also the case of drugs used in emergency contraception, such as levonorgestrel or ulipristal-based drugs (see HERE), because both act via an anti-implantation mechanism in 50% of cases.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

The biological status of the early human embryo. When does human life begins?

“Those who argue that that embryo can be destroyed with impunity will have to prove that this newly created life is not human. And no-one, to the best of our knowledge, has yet been able to do so.”

Introduction

In order to determine the nature of the human embryo, we need to know its biological, anthropological, philosophical, and even its legal reality. In our opinion, however, the anthropological, philosophical and legal reality of the embryo — the basis of its human rights — must be built upon its biological reality (see also HERE).

Consequently, one of the most widely debated topics in the field of bioethics is to determine when human life begins, and particularly to define the biological status of the human embryo, particularly the early embryo, i.e. from impregnation of the egg by the sperm until its implantation in the maternal endometrium.

Irrespective of this, though, this need to define when human life begins (see our article  is also due to the fact that during the early stages of human life — approximately during its first 14 days — this young embryo is subject to extensive and diverse threats that, in many cases, lead to its destruction (see HERE).

These threats affect embryos created naturally, mainly through the use of drugs or technical procedures used in the control of human fertility that act via an anti-implantation mechanism, especially intrauterine devices (as DIU); this is also the case of drugs used in emergency contraception, such as levonorgestrel or ulipristal-based drugs (see HERE), because both act via an anti-implantation mechanism in most of the time.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.