Tag: liability

Bioethics Blogs

Memo To White Nationalists From A Geneticist: Why White Purity Is A Terrible Idea

On
August 14th, UCLA researchers Aaron Panofsky and Joan Donovan presented
findings of their study,  “When Genetics Challenges a Racist’s Identity: Genetic
Ancestry Testing among White Nationalists,”
 at a sociology
conference in Montreal. They’d analyzed 3,070 comments organized into 70
threads publicly posted to the (sometimes difficult to access) “social movement
online community”  Stormfront.

Former
KKK Grand Wizard Don Black launched Stormfront on March 27, 1995. Posts exceed
12 million, ramping up since the 2016 election season. Panofsky and Donovan’s
report has a lot of sociology speak, such as “scholars of whiteness” and
“affiliative self-fashioning,” amid some quite alarming posts – yet also
reveals a sophisticated understanding of genetics from some contributors.

A
WHITE NATIONALIST ONLINE MEET-UP: STORMFRONT

“We are the voice of the new, embattled White minority!”proclaims the
bold, blood-tinged-hued message on the opening page of Stormfront, the “community
of racial realists and idealists.”
 It’s a site for white nationalists,
who are a little less extreme than white supremacists, who want to dominate the
world from their pinnacle of a perceived racial hierarchy. The Stormfronters
seem more concerned with establishing their white purity – defined as “non-Jewish
people of wholly European descent.”

Yet
the lines between white nationalist and supremacist blur, as Stormfront states, “If Blacks or
Mexicans become a majority, then they will not be able to maintain the White
man’s social, cultural and economic systems because they do not have to (sic)
minds needed to do so.”

The
idea of white rights is rather new, catalyzed by the revolts of the truly
marginalized, murdered, abused, ignored, and enslaved.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Memo To White Nationalists From A Geneticist: Why White Purity Is A Terrible Idea

On
August 14th, UCLA researchers Aaron Panofsky and Joan Donovan presented
findings of their study,  “When Genetics Challenges a Racist’s Identity: Genetic
Ancestry Testing among White Nationalists,”
 at a sociology
conference in Montreal. They’d analyzed 3,070 comments organized into 70
threads publicly posted to the (sometimes difficult to access) “social movement
online community”  Stormfront.

Former
KKK Grand Wizard Don Black launched Stormfront on March 27, 1995. Posts exceed
12 million, ramping up since the 2016 election season. Panofsky and Donovan’s
report has a lot of sociology speak, such as “scholars of whiteness” and
“affiliative self-fashioning,” amid some quite alarming posts – yet also
reveals a sophisticated understanding of genetics from some contributors.

A
WHITE NATIONALIST ONLINE MEET-UP: STORMFRONT

“We are the voice of the new, embattled White minority!”proclaims the
bold, blood-tinged-hued message on the opening page of Stormfront, the “community
of racial realists and idealists.”
 It’s a site for white nationalists,
who are a little less extreme than white supremacists, who want to dominate the
world from their pinnacle of a perceived racial hierarchy. The Stormfronters
seem more concerned with establishing their white purity – defined as “non-Jewish
people of wholly European descent.”

Yet
the lines between white nationalist and supremacist blur, as Stormfront states, “If Blacks or
Mexicans become a majority, then they will not be able to maintain the White
man’s social, cultural and economic systems because they do not have to (sic)
minds needed to do so.”

The
idea of white rights is rather new, catalyzed by the revolts of the truly
marginalized, murdered, abused, ignored, and enslaved.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

What the Present Debate About Autonomous Weapons is Getting Wrong

Author: Michael Robillard

Many people are deeply worried about the prospect of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). Many of these worries are merely contingent, having to do with issues like unchecked proliferation or potential state abuse. Several philosophers, however, have advanced a stronger claim, arguing that there is, in principle, something morally wrong with the use of AWS independent of these more pragmatic concerns. Some have argued, explicitly or tacitly, that the use of AWS is inherently morally problematic in virtue of a so-called ‘responsibility gap’ that their use necessarily entails.

We can summarise this thesis as follows:

  1. In order to wage war ethically, we must be able to justly hold someone morally responsible for the harms caused in war.
  2. Neither the programmers of an AWS nor its military implementers could justly be held morally responsible for the battlefield harms caused by AWS.
  3. We could not, as a matter of conceptual possibility, hold an AWS itself morally responsible for its actions, including its actions that cause harms in war.
  4. Hence, a morally problematic ‘gap’ in moral responsibility is created, thereby making it impermissible to wage war through the use of AWS.

This thesis is mistaken. This is so for the simple reason that, at the end of the day, the AWS is an agent in the morally relevant sense or it isn’t.

If it isn’t, then premise 2 is either false and moral responsibility falls on the persons within the causal chain to the extent that they knew or should have known the harm they were contributing to and the degree to which they could have done otherwise, or premise 2 is true but vacuous because the harm was a result of a genuine accident.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Texas Advance Directives Act – Broad Alliance Files Amicus Brief Defending TADA Constitutionality

Kelly v Methodist Hospital challenges the constitutionality of the Texas Advance Directives Act. The case is getting ready for trial in Harris County District Court.


At the end of July, a broad alliance submitted a 28-page amicus brief on behalf of the defendant. The amici include:

  • TEXAS ALLIANCE FOR LIFE
  • TEXAS CATHOLIC CONFERENCE OF BISHOPS
  • TEXAS BAPTIST CHRISTIAN LIFE COMMISSION
  • TEXANS FOR LIFE COALITION
  • COALITION OF TEXANS WITH DISABILITIES
  • TEXAS ALLIANCE FOR PATIENT ACCESS
  • TEXAS MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
  • TEXAS OSTEOPATHIC MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
  • TEXAS HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION
  • LEADINGAGE TEXAS

I will make just two observations about the brief.


1.  The amici argue that there is no state action, because clinician and hospital use of TADA is completely voluntary. They may but need not use TADA. On the other hand, the amici concede that similar process based approaches in other states “had little practical effect” because of the threat of liability. Consequently, they concede that TADA’s provision of safe harbor immunity really did change clinician and hospital behavior. Texas clinicians and hospitals would not withdraw life-sustaining treatment without consent BUT FOR the immunity conferred by TADA.


2.  Since the 1970s, numerous appellate courts (e.g. Quinlan) have held that all sorts of medical treatment issues can and should be handled by hospital committees. But these judicial opinions are very clear that conflicts and disputes should still go to court. Since TADA authorizes hospital review committees to adjudicate life and death disputes, these committees are exercising a judicial function. That is state action sufficient to make constitutional requirements apply to private hospitals like Methodist Houston.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

In a Nutshell II: Ontario Court Decision & MAiD

Jocelyn Downie describes the recent Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision in A.B. v. The Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General for Ontario, which provides an interpretation of “reasonably foreseeable natural death” within the Canadian federal legislation on medical assistance in dying (MAiD).

__________________________________________

On June 17, 2016, new Canadian federal legislation on medical assistance in dying (MAiD) came into effect. The legislation was the government’s response to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Carter v. Canada striking down the Canadian Criminal Code prohibitions on medical assistance in dying. The legislation established eligibility criteria for access to medical assistance in dying (e.g., competent adult) as well as procedural safeguards (e.g., a ten day waiting period between the initial request for medical assistance in dying and the provision).

On June 19, 2017, almost a year to the day after the legislation came into effect, a judge in Ontario issued the first decision to provide an interpretation of one of the most confusing and controversial elements of that legislation.

The Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts (medical assistance in dying) establishes that individuals are only allowed access to medical assistance in dying if, among other things, “their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of their medical circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the specific length of time that they have remaining.” (s.241.2(2)(d)) But what does it mean to say that a natural death is “reasonably foreseeable”?  Does this mean, as various government statements and documents have suggested, that the person is on “an identifiable path” to natural death or that the person’s natural death is “not too remote” or is “in the not too distant future”? 

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

End-of-Life Healthcare Sessions at ASBH 2017

The 2017 ASBH
conference
 in October 2017 includes over 400 workshops, panels, and
papers in bioethics and the health humanities.  Here are ones that pertain
to end-of-life issues.


THURSDAY, OCTOBER 19


THU 1:30 pm:  End-of-Life Care and Decision-Making in the ICU – Limited
English Proficiency as a Predictor of Disparities (Amelia Barwise)


Importance: Navigating choices in predominantly English-speaking care settings
can present practical and ethical challenges for patients with limited English
proficiency (LEP). Decision-making in the ICU is especially difficult and may
be associated with disparities in health care utilization and outcomes in critical
care. 


Objective: To determine if code status, advance directives, decisions to limit
life support, and end-of-life decision-making were different for ICU patients
with LEP compared to English-proficient patients. 


Methods: Retrospective cohort study of adult ICU patients from
5/31/2011-6/1/2014. 779 (2.8%) of our cohort of 27,523 had LEP. 


Results: When adjusted for severity of illness, age, sex, education, and
insurance status, patients with LEP were less likely to change their code
status from full code to do not resuscitate (DNR) during ICU admission (OR,
0.62; 95% CI, 0.46-0.82; p


Conclusion: Patients with LEP had significant differences and disparities in
end-of-life decision-making. Interventions to facilitate informed
decision-making for those with LEP is a crucial component of care for this
group.


THU 1:30 pm:  “But She’ll Die if You Don’t!”: Understanding and
Communicating Risks at the End of Life (Janet Malek)


Clinicians sometimes decline to offer interventions even if their refusal will
result in an earlier death for their patients. For example, a nephrologist may
decide against initiating hemodialysis despite a patient’s rising creatinine
levels if death is expected within weeks even with dialysis.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

 Guest Post: Withdrawing life-prolonging treatment in the patient’s best interests: The implications of Briggs

Guest Post: Jenny Kitzinger, Celia Kitzinger and Jakki Cowley

Paper:  When ‘Sanctity of Life’ and ‘Self-Determination’ clash

In a recent landmark judgment in the Court of Protection (Briggs v Briggs [2016] EWCOP 53), a judge authorised withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment from a minimally conscious patient with potential for further recovery.  Our article in Journal of Medical Ethics addresses the implications of this judgment, highlighting its potential to strengthen compliance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and the delivery of person-centred care.

How this will work in practice is another question.

We have supported families (CK and JK) and represented patients (JC) in a series of cases – several of which have reached court – in which families sought treatment withdrawal and doctors refused.  We know many families who believe that their brain-injured relative would not want to receive on-going life-prolonging interventions.  It usually takes years for families to come to this view and even longer to communicate it to doctors. Some health care professionals can be dismissive – or even hostile – when families speak up.   Even when doctors acknowledge that a patient will never regain consciousness, some have ethical objections to withdrawing treatment from a clinically stable patient.  It feels, they say, like ‘euthanasia’.

An ethical imperative to give treatment is experienced even more acutely, by some doctors, when the patient may make some degree of ‘progress’ – perhaps recovering consciousness and the ability to interact with others.  The treating clinician in the Briggs case was firmly of the view that it would be unethical to withdraw treatment from a patient whose level of consciousness might improve over time. 

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Jahi McMath – Evidence that She Is Now Alive Considered by Court Today

Later today (California time), is a hearing on the Motion for Summary Adjudication of Plaintiff Jahi McMath’s First Cause of Action for Personal Injuries, filed jointly by all defendants (“Defendants”) on March 23, 2017.


Judge Stephen Pulido has posted his tentative ruling. I have pasted that below.   



Defendants and for Plaintiffs McMath et al. (“Plaintiffs”) shall be prepared to address, among other things, the following: 



(1) The supporting and opposition papers are “heavy” on discussion of the various medical diagnoses and opinions but “light” on discussion of the applicable legal standards for the court to apply. For example, though Defendants include a collateral estoppel argument, there is only one paragraph addressing it on the last page of Defendants’ memorandum, with a single case cite as to the general application of collateral estoppel, and this issue is not identified in the Notice of Motion. Is this a separate basis of the motion, and if so, have Defendants given proper notice of this? Which facts in the Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”), if any, are material to this issue? 



(2) The Notice of Motion states that the motion “is made on the grounds that Jahi McMath lacks standing to sue for personal injuries because she was pronounced deceased in accord with California law in December 2013. The undisputed material facts establish that no mistakes were made in the determination of McMath’s brain death in December 2013, and the diagnosis of McMath’s brain death was made in accord with the accepted medical standards required by California law.”

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Diagnostic dilemmas: When potentially transient preexisting diagnoses confer chronic harm

By Elaine Walker
Elaine Walker is the Charles Howard Candler Professor of Psychology and Neuroscience at Emory University.   She leads a research laboratory that is funded by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) to study risk factors for psychosis and other serious mental illnesses.  Her research is focused on the behavioral and neuromaturational changes that precede psychotic disorders.   She has published over 300 scientific articles and 6 books. 
The diagnostic process can be complicated by many factors. Most of these factors reflect limitations in our scientific understanding of the nature and course of disorders. But in the current US healthcare climate, legislative proposals concerning insurance coverage for preexisting conditions add another layer of complexity to the diagnostic process. It is a layer of complexity that is riddled with ethical dilemmas which are especially salient in the field of mental health care. The following discussion addresses the interplay between medical practice and health-care system policy in the diagnostic process. The diagnosis of psychiatric disorders is emphasized because they present unique challenges [1]. 

Of course, some of the complications associated with diagnosis are a function of ambiguous and/or changing diagnostic criteria. For example, the criteria for designating the level of symptom severity that crosses the boundary into clinical disorder change over time as a function of scientific advances. This has occurred for numerous illnesses, including metabolic, cardiovascular, and psychiatric disorders [2]. Further, especially in psychiatry, diagnostic categories undergo revision over time, even to the extent that some behavioral “syndromes” previously considered an illness have been eliminated from diagnostic taxonomies.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

MORE ON THE ECJ VACCINE LIABILITY DECISION

By Alex Stein My friend and mentor, the former Israeli Chief Justice Aharon Barak, used to say that when neither side likes the court’s decision, chances are that the court was right. This is likely to be the case with the … Continue reading

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.