Tag: freedom

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Using AI to Predict Criminal Offending: What Makes it ‘Accurate’, and What Makes it ‘Ethical’.

Jonathan Pugh

Tom Douglas

 

The Durham Police Force plans to use an artificial intelligence system to inform decisions about whether or not to keep a suspect in custody.

Developed using data collected by the Force, The Harm Assessment Risk Tool (HART) has already undergone a 2 year trial period to monitor the accuracy of the tool. Over the trial period, predictions of low risk were accurate 98% of the time, whilst predictions of high risk were accurate 88% of the time, according to media reports. Whilst HART was not so far been used to inform custody sergeants’ decisions during this trial period, the police force now plans to take the system live.

Given the high stakes involved in the criminal justice system, and the way in which artificial intelligence is beginning to surpass human decision-making capabilities in a wide array of contexts, it is unsurprising that criminal justice authorities have sought to harness AI. However, the use of algorithmic decision-making in this context also raises ethical issues. In particular, some have been concerned about the potentially discriminatory nature of the algorithms employed by criminal justice authorities.

These issues are not new. In the past, offender risk assessment often relied heavily on psychiatrists’ judgements. However, partly due to concerns about inconsistency and poor accuracy, criminal justice authorities now already use algorithmic risk assessment tools. Based on studies of the past offenders, these tools use forensic history, mental health diagnoses, demographic variables and other factors to produce a statistical assessment of re-offending risk.

Beyond concerns about discrimination, algorithmic risk assessment tools raise a wide range of ethical questions, as we have discussed with colleagues in the linked paper.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Announcement: James Williams wins Innovative Thinking prize

OUC affiliated student, James Williams, has been awarded the inaugural $100,000 Nine Dots Prize.

Williams, a doctoral candidate researching design ethics, beat 700 other entrants from around the world with his 3,000-word answer to the set question ‘Are digital technologies making politics impossible?’ His entry Stand Out of Our Light: Freedom and Persuasion in the Attention Economy argues that digital technologies are making all forms of politics worth having impossible as they privilege our impulses over our intentions and are ‘designed to exploit our psychological vulnerabilities in order to direct us toward goals that may or may not align with our own.

Read more, including extracts, at Nine Dots website here: https://ninedotsprize.org/winners/james-williams/

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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How Prejudice Can Harm Your Health

Long before the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King declared health inequity the most shocking and inhumane form of injustice, W.E.B. Du Bois wrote that “the Negro death rate and sickness are largely matters of condition and not due to racial traits and tendencies.” Before Du Bois made his case, James McCune Smith — the nation’s first black doctor — carefully detailed the health consequences of freedom and oppression

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Most pressing bioethics issue

In yesterday’s post Mark McQuain asked the readers of this blog what they consider to be the most pressing bioethics issue in the context of a call for our president to establish a bioethics council. He referred to my recent post on reproductive ethics and the manufacturing of children. I think that is important. I also think that abortion including the aborting of children with developmental abnormalities such as Down syndrome, euthanasia, and the treatment of children with gender dysphoria are very important. However, my most pressing concern related to bioethics in our society is freedom of conscience.

It is important that we express clearly the value of human life and how that impacts how we understand the ethics of things such as reproductive technology, abortion and euthanasia, but we are living in a time in which many do not listen to reasoned arguments about what is right. Much of our society believes that what is right is determined by how they feel and they desire to be free of any limits on what they can do. They also believe, somewhat contradictorily, that they should be affirmed in being able to do what they desire by having society help them do it; even if that means that others need to do things that they believe to be wrong. Our society is losing the concept of any objective moral values. Without objective moral values it does not make sense for someone to refuse another person’s request for help in fulfilling their desires based on conscience, particularly conscience informed by an objective understanding of right and wrong.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Cross Post: Italy has introduced mandatory vaccinations – other countries should follow its lead

Written by Alberto Giubilini

This article was originally published on The Conversation 

In the first four months of this year, around 1,500 cases of measles were reported in Italy. As a response to the outbreak, the Italian government introduced a law making 12 vaccinations mandatory for preschool and school-age children.

Parents will have to provide proof of vaccination when they enroll their children in nursery or preschool. In this respect, the Italian policy follows the example of vaccination policies in the US. But there’s one crucial difference: the Italian law doesn’t allow parents to opt out on the grounds of “conscientious objection”.

Unvaccinated school-age children, up to 16 years old, will still be able to enrol in school – but their parents will be fined. The fines range from €500 to €7,500 (£436 to £6,540).

I would argue that these measures are ethically justified, and other countries should follow Italy’s lead.

Undoubtedly, such measures are coercive. Most parents, even if they are opposed to vaccines, will have no choice but to vaccinate their children. But the fact that the new legislation is coercive does not make it ethically impermissible. In fact, it can be argued that many laws are coercive but nonetheless considered ethically acceptable by most people.

To remain in the context of public health, isolation and quarantine are two examples of coercive measures that are sometimes used in public health emergencies. Most people would think that, in many cases, it is acceptable to quarantine or isolate people in order to protect the community from infectious diseases.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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The Virginia Senate prohibits the government from penalising organisations that oppose same-sex marriage

On 9th February, the Virginia Senate approved a bill that would prevent people from being obliged to participate in “the solemnization of any marriage” and protect them from government discrimination for believing only in natural marriage between a man and a woman (same-sex couples, transgender people, single mothers). Senate law 1324, which was passed with 21 votes in favour to 19 against, strengthens the freedom of those who believe in natural marriage to live in accordance with their beliefs and prohibits the government from penalising organisations that oppose same-sex “marriage”. If it becomes law, non-profit organisations cannot be refused concessions or government funding solely based on their stance on marriage (see HERE).

La entrada The Virginia Senate prohibits the government from penalising organisations that oppose same-sex marriage aparece primero en Bioethics Observatory.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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The Virginia Senate prohibits the government from penalising organisations that oppose same-sex marriage

On 9th February, the Virginia Senate approved a bill that would prevent people from being obliged to participate in “the solemnization of any marriage” and protect them from government discrimination for believing only in natural marriage between a man and a woman (opposed to same-sex couples, transgender people, single mothers). Senate law 1324, which was passed with 21 votes in favour to 19 against, strengthens the freedom of opponents same-sex marriage to live in accordance with their beliefs and prohibits the government from penalising them. The law states that non-profit organisations cannot be refused concessions or government funding solely based on their stance on marriage (see HERE).

View more HERE

La entrada The Virginia Senate prohibits the government from penalising organisations that oppose same-sex marriage aparece primero en Bioethics Observatory.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics:In It To Win It: Is Prize-giving Bad for Philosophy? Written by Rebecca Buxton

This essay received an Honorable Mention in the Graduate Category of the Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics 2017

Written by University of Oxford student, Rebecca Buxton

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
We live in a culture of prize-giving. The Nobel Prize, the Medal of Honour, the Man Booker and, not least, the Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics. But, in giving such prizes, and indeed prize money, we operate under the assumption that prizes are ‘good’. However, the fact that I am offered a prize for writing
a practical ethics paper is itself a practical ethical conundrum. This essay takes a preliminary amble into the ethical problem of prize-giving with regards to Philosophy specifically, offering reasons as to why we should question current practice. Primarily, I will define what we mean by the term ‘prize’ noting its
necessary and sufficient features. Secondly, I discuss the impact of prize-giving on research, considering how the ramifications of ascribing value through prizes affects the course of academia, especially when focusing on the lack of diverse voices within the subject. I then consider the deeper question of philosophical value: does the very act of constructing an ethical argument for a prize diminish the value of the work?

THE IDEA OF ‘THE PRIZE’
Though prize-giving is prolific in our current institutional culture, we lack any analytically clear literature on what constitutes a ‘prize’. There is, however, some work focusing on the philosophical concept of ‘the gift’, most notably Derrida’s argument that the ‘true’ gift is impossible as we can never eliminate the possibility of the counter-gift.[1]

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Ethics, sexuality, and dementia in long-term care

Alisa Grigorovich and Pia Kontos suggest that long-term care residents with dementia can benefit from leisure and social activities that are supportive of sexual expression and the formation of intimate and romantic relationships.

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Recently, media stories on dementia have focused on the sexualities of persons living with dementia in residential long-term care settings, such as nursing homes. This media attention has been predominantly negative, consisting of descriptions of sexual violence, and apocalyptic warnings of the legal, ethical, and moral dangers of allowing persons with dementia to express their sexuality.

Often the primary criterion used to determine whether sexual encounters between residents with dementia are involuntary is the cognitive ability of the female resident. Frequently, she is characterized as globally incapable of agreeing to sexual activity because of cognitive impairment.

Consider, for example, the now infamous case of Henry Rayhons. He was accused (and ultimately acquitted) of sexually assaulting his wife who had dementia. As well, there is the lawsuit filed in a case involving two residents with dementia who had intercourse while living in Windmill Manor. While such stories highlight the importance of protecting vulnerable persons from sexual abuse, they ignore the need to also ensure that persons with dementia have opportunities to pursue intimate and romantic relationships.

Sexual expression is a universal human need that transcends age and disability. It has many positive health and wellness benefits, including the opportunity to experience pleasure, decreased pain sensitivity, and increased relaxation. However, older persons living in nursing homes often experience reduced sexual freedom.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: The Ethical Dilemma of Youth Politics, written by Andreas Masvie

 This essay was the runner up in the undergraduate category of the Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics 2017

Written by University of Oxford Student, Andreas Masvie

 

The West in general, and perhaps Europe in particular, tend to celebrate youth politics as a vital force of democracy. This is reflected in the current literature on youth politics, which appears to be almost exclusively descriptive (e.g. ‘What is the level of youth politics in country X?’) or positively normative (e.g. ‘How can country X heighten engagement in youth politics?’). Various youth councils and parliaments are encouraged and empowered by government as well as civil society, both at local and national level. This is also the case internationally. The UN, for instance, demands that youth politics be stimulated: “[Such] engagement and participation is central to achieving sustainable human development.”[1] I will approach the rationale of this collective celebration as a syllogism, defining ‘youth politics’ as organized political engagement of people aged 13–25:

P1        Youth politics increases the level of political engagement;

P2        Political engagement promotes democratic vitality and sustainability; thus

C1        Youth politics promotes democratic vitality and sustainability.

In this paper I am interested in challenging P2. Does the increased political engagement due to youth politics promote democratic vitality and sustainability? For the sake of argument, I will posit the trueness of P1. When it comes to P2: it would be difficult to argue that all forms of political engagement promote democratic vitality and sustainability (e.g. authoritarian neo-Nazism or revolutionary Communism). Hence, I shall take it for granted that P2 is constrained to activities and policies compatible with democracy.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.