Tag: donors

Bioethics News

Human genetic architecture, mapped for the first time, shows objective sexual differences

Men and women is not just a social construct as affirm gender ideology. This work provides evidences of the sex-differential transcriptome and its importance to human entire body and physiology. Around 6,500 genes with activity that was biased toward one sex or the other in at least one tissue.

Shmuel Pietrokovski and Moran Gershoni, both researchers in the Molecular Genetics Department at the Weizmann Institute of Sciences, have revealed that close to 6,500 protein-coding human genes react differently in males and females (BMC, 6 – 1 – 2017, see HERE).

This finding is contrary to gender ideology, which considers that the difference between men and women is a social and/or cultural fact, i.e., a construct, rather than something biological or natural (see HERE). In a recent article, the scientists said that, in order identify the thousands of genes, they turned to the GTex project, a very large study of human gene expression in which numerous organs and tissues of the body had been examined in more than 550550 adult donors

Human sex genetic architecture differences were mapped

According to the authors, “that project enabled, for the first time, the comprehensive mapping of the human sex-differential genetic architecture”.

The researchers examined close to 20,000 protein-coding genes, classifying them by sex and searching for differences in expression in each tissue.

The eventually identified “around 6,500 genes with activity that was biased toward one sex or the other in at least one tissue”.

In the same manner, many genes that are associated with sexually dimorphic traits might undergo differential selection, which will likely impact reproduction, evolution, and even speciation events.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Françoise Baylis and Carolyn McLeod (eds), Family-Making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges, Oxford University Press, 2014

This fascinating anthology focuses on the question of how we make families, and how bionormative assumptions shape or distort our collective thinking about parenting, children’s welfare, and state obligations to parents and children. The editors are primarily interested in the question of whether parents’ moral responsibilities toward children differ for children produced through assistive reproductive technologies (ART) compared to children brought into the family via adoption. As the editors point out, in the realm of ART, most of the philosophical literature has been focused on parental autonomy and rights to assistance in reproducing, while the adoption literature is almost entirely focused on the protection of children. The anthology does an excellent job of exploring this disconnect, and probing assumptions about moral responsibilities within family-making. Taken as a whole, the chapters explore “whether people should rely on others’ reproductive labour in having children, whether they should ensure that they will have a genetic tie to their children or that their children will have some connection to genetic relatives, whether they should bring a new child into the world at all, whether they should agree to what the government would require of them for an adoption, where they should live if the family they make is multi-racial, at what age they should forgo having children, and the list goes on” (6).

The first section of the book sets the stage with two excellent chapters on the goods of parenting (Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift) and the goods of childhood (Samantha Brennan). The goods of parenting are distinguished from other related goodsintimacy with another adult or friend, friendship with a child, being an uncle, having a pet, etc.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

Book Review: Cells Are The New Cure (BenBella Books, Inc., 2017). ISBN 9781944648800.

$26.95. Reviewed by Michael S. Dauber, MA

 

Cells Are The New Cure, written by Robin Smith, MD, and Max Gomez, PhD, is a book about the history of medical research on cells, both human and non-human, and recent developments in these techniques that have made cellular medicine one of the most promising fields for therapeutic exploration. While the book’s title suggests an exclusive focus on the healing aspects of genetic modification and human stem cell therapy, the text is much more than that: it is a roadmap for understanding the origins of such techniques, the current state of affairs in cellular and genetic therapies, the administrative landscape investigators must traverse in conducting research, and the areas in which we still need to make progress.

Smith and Gomez make an argument that is structurally simple yet gripping: they suggest that targeted therapies involving stem cells and genetic modifications are the future of medicine by pointing to the immense amount of studies in those fields that have yielded beneficial results. While many readers might acknowledge this fact even before reading the book, many may not be aware of the full extent of the knowledge we have gained from research on cells and genetics, or the myriad ways this knowledge has been applied. Of course, Smith and Gomez cover the big diseases that most people think of when imagining medical research: cancer, heart disease, neurodegenerative conditions, etc. However, the book also contains detailed information about how we age, what may cause certain allergies, how the body repairs itself, and the ways stem cell therapies, genetic editing techniques, and other complex medicines that build on these methods can be used to treat these conditions.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

Meyerhoff Professor Grapples with Bioethical Issues

crossposted from Rising to the Challenge: The Campaign for Johns Hopkins

 


 

 

How should resources be allocated between HIV treatment for those already infected and finding ways to prevent HIV to avert more illness and death in the long run?

 

This is the sort of thorny question Jeremy Sugarman, MD, MPH, MA – deputy director for medicine of the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics and the Harvey “Bud” M. Meyerhoff Professor of Bioethics and Medicine – tackles in his research.

 

And he credits the Meyerhoff Professorship for not only bringing him to Hopkins, but giving him the freedom to take chances in his research and help those who are most vulnerable.

 

“The professorship made it possible to explore things that were a little bit more risky in bioethics. Classically, we need to raise money to do particular projects, and those particular projects are very circumscribed. We can’t always take on a venture, something new, something unusual,” Sugarman explains.

 

“The professorship gave me the opportunity to work with colleagues in the School of Medicine, in the Bloomberg School of Public Health, and across the university, on questions of bioethics that otherwise may not be addressed,” he says. Some of these earlier projects involved international HIV prevention trials in border regions of China and Thailand and preventing HIV transmission from mother to child in Uganda.

 

“Previously, I wouldn’t have time to just leave, go on a trip, work with those people, and grapple with some of the ethical issues that people around the globe were facing.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

Organ donation from euthanized patients. The practice is controversial and currently only allowed in Belgium an Netherlands

In 2015, 2023 patients were euthanized only in Belgium.  Organ donation from euthanized patients These patients could, in theory, be organ donors; however, 926 (45.8%) were excluded because they were over 75 years old.

A total of 684 organs were eventually useful for donation in Belgium. But, in Belgium and Netherlands, the countries that this practice is permitted, it is rarely performed; as of August 2016, 43 patients undergoing euthanasia had donated organs. The same year, 1288 Belgian patients were on transplant waiting lists (See HERE).  It is clear that, although the organs from euthanized subjects could in some measure reduce transplant waiting lists, the fact that they are obtained from euthanized patients presents unquestionable ethical difficulties.

La entrada Organ donation from euthanized patients. The practice is controversial and currently only allowed in Belgium an Netherlands aparece primero en Bioethics Observatory.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

When Women are Surrogate Mothers: Is that work?

Alana Cattapan, Angela Cameron, and Vanessa Gruben warn that speaking about “compensation” is a way of avoiding difficult conversations about payment to surrogates.

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A recent Canadian Medical Association Journal (CMAJ) news article reported that the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society (CFAS) has called for the federal government to reconsider the ban on payment for surrogacy in Canada. The article suggests that industry professionals and academics alike are coming around on compensation for surrogacy, with support growing all the time.

In Canada, payment for surrogacy, egg donation, and sperm donation is banned under the 2004 Assisted Human Reproduction Act. Under the Act, surrogates (like egg donors and sperm donors) can be reimbursed for receipted expenses. With a note from their doctor, surrogates can also receive some money for lost work-related income during pregnancy.

The Act states that this reimbursement of expenses must follow the relevant regulations. Until now, however, these regulations have never been drafted. After more than a decade, Health Canada is now in the throes of making them. This is occurring as surrogacy in Canada is expanding to accommodate more and more people from countries where surrogacy is more expensive, harder to access or banned completely.

Women Working in a Field by Winslow Homer 1867.

It is in this context that the CFAS (which is a part-medical association, part-industry organization representing the fertility industry and its doctors, lawyers, scientists and ethicists) has called for the government to reconsider the ban on payment.

 It is important to know that the market in surrogacy in Canada is a profitable one.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

Organ donation for transplantation in children with cardiac arrest and dying person dignity

Premortem interventions before donation in circulatory arrest in children could have objective ethical problems 

(See our special reports about criterion of death and organs transplantation HERE)

Up until a few years ago, performing medical interventions in end-of-life situations had been proposed as actions centered on the best interests of the dying patient.

The growing demand for organs for transplantation has created a need to increase the number of organ donors (see HERE).

Since the number of brain-dead donors is currently insufficient to meet the needs of patients on the transplant waiting list, medical procedures have been developed in the last decade aimed at ensuring that the organs from donors in cardiac arrest are also suitable for successful solid organ transplantation (see HERE our article about the relation between excellent figures of organ donation and organ donors with cardiac arrest in Spain).

Nevertheless, in order to achieve sufficient organ viability in donors with cardiac arrest, a series of medical procedures need to be performed that have the main aim of reducing the warm ischaemia time to which these organs are subjected, in order to increase the chances of post-transplant success.

An article has recently been published in the Journal of Medical Ethics (1“Premortem interventions in dying children to optimise organ donation: an ethical analysis”, whose authors Joe Brierley and David Shaw analyze the ethical and legal aspects of premortem interventions performed in dying children, aimed at optimizing organ donation for transplantation following cardiac arrest.

Premortem interventions in pediatric patients for organ donation from an ethical perspective

This article examines the legislative aspects (specific to the United Kingdom), and also gives a description and analysis of the elements that, from an ethical perspective, might support – or contradict – the performance of premortem interventions in pediatric patients for organ donation.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

First case of deceased donor uterine transplantation. It is a relevant medical and social issue

Being able to resolve the reproductive problems suffered by women who have no uterus – whether due to an organic cause or functional abnormality of the uterus – is unquestionably a major medical and social issue.

The two possible solutions to this problem are uterus transplantation or surrogacy, the latter solution presenting objective ethical difficulties.

Uterus transplants to date have been performed using living donors, with unpredictable outcomes. Now, the first case of deceased donor uterine transplantation performed in the United States has been published. The recipient of the uterus was a woman with Mayer-Rokitansky-Kuster-Hauser syndrome, that is, she had no uterus.

The journal Fertility and Sterility has disseminated a video describing the essential steps in this transplantation process, particularly as regards selection of a suitable donor with no history of infertility or uterine malformations. The death of the donor should be determined by presentation of brain death but not cardiac death. The authors concluded that: “Uterine transplantation, although currently experimental, has gained the potential to become the first true treatment for uterine factor infertility. This procedure can become a promising option for the approximately 1.5 million women worldwide for whom pregnancy is not possible because of the absence of the uterus or presence of a nonfunctional uterus. Deceased donor uterine transplantation will further serve to broaden accessibility for this treatment.”

Ethical approach

For our part, as the organ donor is a deceased person with brain death (see true definition of this death HERE), we see no ethical issue for this practice; on the contrary, it seems an encouraging medical prospect to resolve the reproductive problem of women who have no uterus or whose uterus is not functionally useful, although the risk-benefit balance must always be taken into account, especially as regards the surgical act.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Cross Post: Re: Nudges in a Post-truth World 

Guest Post: Nathan Hodson

This article originally appeared on the Journal of Medical Ethics Blog 

In a recent article in the Journal of Medical EthicsNeil Levy has developed a concept of “nudges to reason,” offering a new tool for those trying to reconcile medical ethics with the application of behavioural psychological research – a practice known as nudging. Very roughly, nudging means adjusting the way choices are presented to the public in order to promote certain decisions.

As Levy notes, some people are concerned that nudges present a threat to autonomy. Attempts at reconciling nudges with ethics, then, are important because nudging in healthcare is here to stay but we need to ensure it is used in ways that respect autonomy (and other moral principles).

The term “nudge” is perhaps a misnomer. To fill out the concept a bit, it commonly denotes the use of behavioural economics and behavioural psychology to the construction of choice architecture through carefully designed trials. But every choice we face, in any context, already comes with a choice architecture: there are endless contextual factors that impact the decisions we make.

When we ask whether nudging is acceptable we are asking whether an arbitrary or random choice architecture is more acceptable than a deliberate choice architecture, or whether an uninformed choice architecture is better than one informed by research.

In fact the permissibility of a nudge derives from whether it is being used in an ethically acceptable way, something that can only be explored on an individual basis. Thaler and Sunstein locate ethical acceptability in promoting the health of the person being nudged (and call this Libertarian Paternalism — i.e.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Re: Nudges in a Post-truth World 

Guest Post: Nathan Hodson 

In a recent article in the Journal of Medical Ethics, Neil Levy has developed a concept of “nudges to reason,” offering a new tool for those trying to reconcile medical ethics with the application of behavioural psychological research – a practice known as nudging. Very roughly, nudging means adjusting the way choices are presented to the public in order to promote certain decisions.

As Levy notes, some people are concerned that nudges present a threat to autonomy. Attempts at reconciling nudges with ethics, then, are important because nudging in healthcare is here to stay but we need to ensure it is used in ways that respect autonomy (and other moral principles).

The term “nudge” is perhaps a misnomer. To fill out the concept a bit, it commonly denotes the use of behavioural economics and behavioural psychology to the construction of choice architecture through carefully designed trials. But every choice we face, in any context, already comes with a choice architecture: there are endless contextual factors that impact the decisions we make.

When we ask whether nudging is acceptable we are asking whether an arbitrary or random choice architecture is more acceptable than a deliberate choice architecture, or whether an uninformed choice architecture is better than one informed by research.

In fact the permissibility of a nudge derives from whether it is being used in an ethically acceptable way, something that can only be explored on an individual basis. Thaler and Sunstein locate ethical acceptability in promoting the health of the person being nudged (and call this Libertarian Paternalism — i.e.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.