Tag: discrimination

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Sex and gender. New findings, new controversy

‘Patients who had undergone sex reassignment surgery at his hospital, stated that the problems presented by patients before the surgery had not been resolved, at either human relationship, work or emotional level.’

Introduction

Sex and gender. Dr. Lawrence S. Mayer, an epidemiologist specialising in Psychiatry, and Dr. Paul R. McHugh, said to be the most important American psychiatrist of the last half century, have recently published a study entitled “Sexuality and Gender” in the journal The New Atlantis (see HERE), which offers an exhaustive review of more than five hundred scientific articles related with this matter. “I was alarmed to learn that the LGBT community bears a disproportionate rate of mental health problems compared to the population as a whole”, says Dr. Mayer, one of the authors of the article. 1

Background

In November 2014, Dr. McHugh had already published a report on the website First Things2, in which he explained his decision as head of the Psychiatry Department at John Hopkins hospital in Baltimore, US, to no longer propose any sex reassignment surgery, in view of the negative findings that he obtained after a retrospective examination of patients who had undergone the procedure.

In the current article, the authors looked at studies published in recent years, in an attempt to establish statistically significant, well-proven evidence. Compared to other related studies, which often offer contradictory results on the topic, this one is distinguished by the large amount of data from many different sources, which gives it special credibility, as well as the backing of its indisputably eminent authors.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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The Virginia Senate prohibits the government from penalising organisations that oppose same-sex marriage

On 9th February, the Virginia Senate approved a bill that would prevent people from being obliged to participate in “the solemnization of any marriage” and protect them from government discrimination for believing only in natural marriage between a man and a woman (same-sex couples, transgender people, single mothers). Senate law 1324, which was passed with 21 votes in favour to 19 against, strengthens the freedom of those who believe in natural marriage to live in accordance with their beliefs and prohibits the government from penalising organisations that oppose same-sex “marriage”. If it becomes law, non-profit organisations cannot be refused concessions or government funding solely based on their stance on marriage (see HERE).

La entrada The Virginia Senate prohibits the government from penalising organisations that oppose same-sex marriage aparece primero en Bioethics Observatory.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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The Virginia Senate prohibits the government from penalising organisations that oppose same-sex marriage

On 9th February, the Virginia Senate approved a bill that would prevent people from being obliged to participate in “the solemnization of any marriage” and protect them from government discrimination for believing only in natural marriage between a man and a woman (opposed to same-sex couples, transgender people, single mothers). Senate law 1324, which was passed with 21 votes in favour to 19 against, strengthens the freedom of opponents same-sex marriage to live in accordance with their beliefs and prohibits the government from penalising them. The law states that non-profit organisations cannot be refused concessions or government funding solely based on their stance on marriage (see HERE).

View more HERE

La entrada The Virginia Senate prohibits the government from penalising organisations that oppose same-sex marriage aparece primero en Bioethics Observatory.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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The Very Early Embryo & Its Moral Signifiance

by Andrew J. Prunty

As technology and biological research continue to develop in the twenty-first century, it is necessary to address and further define the ethical considerations of embryonic research and the appropriate rights that may limit the extent of human research on zygotes, blastocysts, and fetal scientific advancement. Because the area of harvesting embryonic stem cells remains significantly undefined, both legally and morally, there are vastly different opinions between researchers and bioethicists, mainly because of ethical limitations, on the rights that should be granted to cells with the potential to develop into human beings and the consequences of neglecting significant scientific research or advancement.

Current laws in the United States differ at the federal and state level, but there is no consistency in recognizing human embryos as humans, or affording them the same legal rights granted to a child; in fact, legal precedent actually detracts certain rights from developing embryos, favoring a human’s ability to destroy a potential human being (i.e. Roe v. Wade[i]) or the categorization of embryos as property (i.e. Davis v. Davis[ii], A.Z. v. B.Z.[iii], Marriage of Dahl[iv], or Reber v. Reiss[v]). These case law samples suggest the courts’ inability to reach a conclusion as to what is the status of an embryo.

The debate is not only circumscribed to matters of research, but to fundamental controversial and intertwined issues of bioethics such as: when life begins, embryonic stem cells, fetal rights, abortion, et cetera. All these topics are contentious and when one topic arises, they begin to comingle.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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The Ethics of In Vitro Gametogenesis

Françoise Baylis comments on the ethics of using gametes derived from human induced pluripotent stem cells for future human reproduction.

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A recent New York Times article, provocatively titled “Babies from Skin Cells? Prospect is Unsettling to Some Experts,” has once again drawn attention to controversial research by scientists at Kyushu University in Japan who succeeded in making fertile mouse pups using eggs created through in vitro gametogenesis (IVG). This is a reproductive technology that involves creating functional gametes (sperm and eggs) from induced pluripotent stem cells. Induced pluripotent stem cells are cells derived from adult body cells (such as skin cells) that have the ability to become other body cells including reproductive cells (sperm and eggs).

Supporters of this reproductive technology eagerly anticipate similar research in humans. Indeed, enthusiasts are quick to trumpet the potential benefits of in vitro gametogenesis. These benefits fall into three general categories.

First, we are told that research to derive human gametes from induced pluripotent stem cells is important for basic science. It will advance our understanding of gamete formation, human development, and genetic disease. In turn, this increased understanding will create new options for regenerative medicine.

Second, we are told that this research will allow clinicians to improve fertility services. For example, with in vitro fertilization (IVF), women typically have to undergo hormonal stimulation and egg retrieval. This can be onerous in terms of the time required for interviews, counseling, and medical procedures. It can also be harmful. Potential psychological harms include significant stress and its sequelae.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Inner Sense and Gender Dysphoria

Steve Phillips posted on “Caring for people with gender dysphoria” almost one year ago. In his post, he referenced a talk at a previous CBHD Summer Conference by Prof. Robert George, where Dr. George posited that the concept that the belief that one’s gender is based one’s innate or inner sense rather than one’s biological/physical sex is rooted in the Gnostic idea that human beings consist of a personal mind that lives in a non-personal body and that this stands in contrast to the longstanding Christian understanding of unity of non-material soul/spirit and material body making up the whole person. I did not attend that talk but offer a recent paper by Dr. George which covers the same ground as backdrop to this post.

The reason for the discussion of Gnosticism related to an earlier point in that same blog referencing the opinion of Dr. Paul McHugh, retired psychiatrist at Johns Hopkins University, who has over the past few years published comments arguing that gender dysphoria is a result of disordered thinking, that is, a mental disorder, requiring treatment, not surgery to complete a gender transition. Dr. McHugh has made much of the fact that Johns Hopkins, despite being an early leader in gender transition surgery, decided very early on that gender transition surgery was not sufficiently efficacious and discontinued the practice.

What a difference a year can make. Johns Hopkins has recently decided to resume what they are calling gender-affirming surgery and specifically point out that when “individuals associated with Johns Hopkins exercise the right of expression, they do not speak on behalf of the institution.”

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: Prostitution: You Can’t Have Your Cake and Sell It*. Written by Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette

This essay received an Honorable Mention in the Graduate Category of the Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics 2017

Written by University of Oxford student, Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette

Abstract:        I offer a new** argument for the thesis that prostitution is not just a normal job. It has the advantage of being compatible with the claim that humans should have full authority over their sexual life. In fact, it is ultimately the emphasis on this authority that leads the thesis that prostitution is a normal job to collapse. Here is the argument: merchants cannot (both legally and morally) discriminate whom they transact with on the basis of factors like the ethnicity or the religion of their client; but if prostitutes are ‘sex merchants’, then they cannot (both legally and morally) discriminate whom they have sex with on the basis of these factors. Yet everyone should have the full discretionary power to refuse to have sex under any circumstances.

1. Introduction

You have made it thus far: the wedding preparation is almost over. You enter your local bakery, cheekily anticipating the moment when you’ll order a wedding cake for ‘John & John’. But to your dismay, the baker turns you down because your marriage goes against his ‘Christian beliefs’.

This is a true story and it is a recurrent one. In 2013, Administrative Law Judge Robert N. Spencer found the owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop guilty of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.[1] The decision was then maintained by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission[2] and again by the Court of Appeal[3].

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics: What Makes Discrimination Wrong? Written by Paul de Font-Reaulx

This essay was the winner in the Undergraduate Category of the Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics 2017

Written by University of Oxford student, Paul de Font-Reaulx

 

The question of this essay is this: What makes discrimination wrong? Most of us intuitively take discrimination based on gender or ethnicity to be impermissible because we have strong rights to be treated on the basis of merit and capacity rather than e.g. ethnicity or gender. I argue that this suggestion is indefensible. I show that well-informed discrimination can sometimes be permissible, and even morally required, meaning we cannot have absolute rights not to be discriminated against. In the last part I suggest an alternative account, arguing that acts of discrimination are wrong because they violate individuals’ weak right to be treated fairly and create negative externalities which – analogously to pollution – there is a collective responsibility to minimize. These results are counterintuitive, and require further attention.

1.     What is Discrimination?

I take discrimination to be to treat someone very differently based on an irrelevant trait. A trait is relevant if and only if it by itself provides reasons for different treatment in some instance, such as constituting a difference in merit or capacity. Otherwise it is irrelevant. For example, in the case of boxing the trait of weighing 70kg is relevant for finding opponents, while as the trait of hair colour is not. Of the two, only different treatment on the basis of the latter would constitute discrimination[1].

Discrimination based on bigotry such as racism is often indefensible simply because it rests on ungrounded beliefs about the relevance of traits such as ethnicity.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Announcement: 3rd Annual Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics

After our enforced time offline it is with great pleasure that we can now announce and publish the winners of the Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics 2017 on the Practical Ethics in the News Blog.

The winner of the Undergraduate Category is Paul de Font-Reaulx, with his essay ‘What Makes Discrimination Wrong?’

The runner up in the Undergraduate Category is Andreas Masvie with his essay ‘The Ethical Dilemma of Youth Politics’.

The winner of the Graduate Category is Romy Eskens with her essay ‘Is Sex With Robots rape? On the Permissibility of Cosentless Sex With Robots’.

The runner up in the Graduate Category is Jonas Haeg with his essay ‘Should We Completely Ban “Political Bots”?’

Honourable Mentions have been given to the following entrants:

Undergraduate Category:

Isabel Canfield: ‘Secondary Intention in Euthanasia’.

Graduate Category:

Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette: ‘Prostitution: You Can’t Have Your Cake and Sell It.’

Fergus Peace: ‘Global Warming and Vegetarianism: What should I do, when what I do makes no difference?’

Rebecca Buxton: ‘In It To Win It: Is Prize Giving Bad for Philosophy?’

We wish congratulations to the four finalists for their excellent essays and presentations, and in particular to the winners of each category.  We also send congratulations to the honourable mentions, and to all of the entrants in this prize.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

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Increasing Access to Biosimilar Drugs

The development of ‘specialty drugs’
in the health care industry has created legal, ethical, and public policy
issues because patients are not able to get access to their prescribed
medications based on the expense.  Specialty
drugs are usually biologicals, treat serious conditions, and  are very expensive with no cheap
alternatives.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.