Tag: conscience

Bioethics Blogs

Ethics & Society Newsfeed: August 18, 2017

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Politics

Neil Gorsuch Speech at Trump Hotel Raises Ethical Questions
“Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, President Trump’s Supreme Court appointee, is scheduled to address a conservative group at the Trump International Hotel in Washington next month, less than two weeks before the court is set to hear arguments on Mr. Trump’s travel ban.”

Trump’s Washington DC hotel turns $2m profit amid ethics concerns
“Donald Trump’s company is said to have taken home nearly $2m in profits this year at its extravagant hotel in Washington, DC – amid ethics concerns stemming from the President’s refusal to fully divest from his businesses while he is in office.”

3 representatives want to officially censure Trump after Charlottesville
“In response to Donald Trump’s controversial remarks about the violence in Charlottesville, Virginia, three Democrats want to censure the president.”

Does Trump’s Slippery Slope Argument About Confederate Statues Have Merit?
“NPR’s Robert Siegal talks with Ilya Somin, a professor of George Mason University, about President Trump’s warning that pulling down Confederate statues may lead to a slippery slope in which monuments to the Founding Fathers are torn down.”

Bioethics/Medical Ethics and Research Ethics

Vaccination: Costly clash between autonomy, public health
Bioethical principles in conflict with medical exemptions to vaccinations

CRISPR and the Ethics of Human Embryo Research
“Although scientists in China and the United Kingdom have already used gene editing on human embryos, the announcement that the research is now being done in the United States makes a U.S. policy response all the more urgent.”

Exclusive: Inside The Lab Where Scientists Are Editing DNA In Human Embryos
“[Critics] fear editing DNA in human embryos is unsafe, unnecessary and could open the door to “designer babies” and possibly someday to genetically enhanced people who are considered superior by society.”

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Charlie Gard: Three Issues That Did Not Make Social Media

by Ann Mongoven, Ph.D., MPH

All hearts go out to the Gard family in this time of grief for their son, Charlie.

The legal wrangling over Charlie’s care became a political football–unfortunately, about many things having little to do with Charlie.

Despite the involvement of Pope Francis, this was not a case about abortion rights or the sanctity of human life. Catholic tradition warns both that quality-of-life arguments can dehumanize the disabled, and that unduly burdensome medical care can become assaultive. There is no “Catholic” view of the case, and Catholic moral theologians disagree about it.

Despite the involvement of Donald Trump, this was not a case about the relative merits of the U.K. National Health Service (NHS) versus other health systems. It was not a case of utilitarian ethics pitted against duty-based ethics or love. The NHS provided extremely expensive intensive care for Charlie for most of his life, and British courts governed cases related to his care solely by a “best interest of the child” standard– amidst heated disagreement between Charlie’s parents and doctors about his interests. The European Court of Human Rights backed the British court decision.

The case did address questions about who should decide when parents and doctors disagree about a child’s medical interest. But contrary to some portrayals in the American press, it neither changed conventional parameters for addressing those questions, nor exposed major differences in legal reasoning used to address them in the U.K. and the U.S.  Both countries appeal to “best interest” standards for resolution, and both reject an absolutist interpretation of parental rights.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

My Sister’s Keeper: An Assessment of Living Organ Donation among Minors

by Alex Fleming

The 2009 film My Sister’s Keeper, based on Jodi Picoult’s 2004 New York Times bestselling novel which bears the same name, is among other things, a controversial story about a young girl (Anna Fitzgerald) who sues her own parents in order to obtain legal rights to the use of her body. For as long as she can remember, Anna has unwillingly been providing blood and bone marrow to her older and critically ill sister, Kate. As the story unfolds, tension within the family arises as the 13 year-old Anna Fitzgerald becomes fully aware of her reason for existence, so to speak, which is to prevent the death of her older sister by providing a regular supply of blood and bone marrow, which she has done regularly for several years. Later on, as Kate’s condition worsens and her renal function begins to fail, the parents naturally turn to Anna to provide what could be a life-saving kidney transplant for her older sister. The climax of the story begins as Anna confidently and heroically refuses. The story raises a slew of bioethical issues which are beyond the scope of this essay; however, the story sheds light on a topic worthy of discussion: living organ donation among minors.

As the supply of organs suitable for transplantation decreases and the demand for them increases, the question of living organ donation among those yet of age has become a question of greater concern, primarily among those who point to the various ethical implications which such a procedure creates.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Transferring Embryos with Genetic Anomalies

Jackie Leach Scully argues that respect for equality and diversity, and not just respect for the parental autonomy and the welfare of the future child, should inform policies governing the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis.

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The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine recently published an Opinion on “Transferring embryos with genetic anomalies detected in preimplantation testing.” The Opinion aims to help providers deal with the rare but ethically difficult situation when prospective parents want to transfer embryos with a known genetic anomaly that is linked to a serious health-affecting disorder.

Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is typically used by couples to avoid transferring a genetic anomaly to their children. Using PGD to ensure the transfer of a genetic anomaly, rather than avoid it, seems deeply counter-intuitive. Yet, there are several scenarios where this might happen. For example, this might be a reasonable option when the only transferable embryos carry the genetic anomaly, or when the embryos carry a different, but potentially just as serious, genetic variation.

The most problematic cases, however, occur when prospective parents express an actual preference for children with ‘their’ genetic condition – an anomalous condition that others perceive in negative terms. It’s an uncommon situation, but despite its rarity steps have been taken to block attempts by prospective parents to ‘choose disability’, such as the UK’s legislation on reproductive medicine. The legislation prohibits the use of an embryo (or gamete, in the case of egg and sperm donation) that has a genetic anomaly “involving a significant risk” of “a serious physical or mental disability, serious illness, or a serious medical condition” unless there are no other unaffected embryos or gametes that could be used instead.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Charlie Gard, the New England Journal of Medicine, and the Limits of “Conscience”

I would venture that most bioethicists would agree it would be ethically permissible to remove life support and active care from little Charlie Gard, and let him die.   The hospital in Britain where he has been receiving his care wants to do that, and the courts agree.  But why do they insist on this action when his parents want to transfer him for another try at experimental treatment, have raised the money, and reportedly have a center in the US willing to accept him for such an attempt?

I can think of two reasons.  One is a frank utilitarian insistence on limiting costs.  It has been publicly charged that is precisely the motive for this and similar recent cases in the U.S.

Or it could be that those caregivers who argue against the futility of such care do so on conscience grounds.  This is at least a more charitable reading.

But if that is the case, then might we not ask:  on what grounds do such conscience concerns mandate blocking the wishes of the baby’s parents—setting aside just how quickly the futility of further care would be evident?  It is commonly argued that practitioners who wish not to provide abortions or participate in assisted suicide retain a professional obligation to refer to someone who will perform the procedure in question.

So why don’t we demand that the British hospital actively refer Charlie’s parents to another facility?  Just wondering…

Maybe the parents in this case are the ones appealing to conscience, but, in the view of the medicolegal authorities, wrongly so. 

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Most pressing bioethics issue

In yesterday’s post Mark McQuain asked the readers of this blog what they consider to be the most pressing bioethics issue in the context of a call for our president to establish a bioethics council. He referred to my recent post on reproductive ethics and the manufacturing of children. I think that is important. I also think that abortion including the aborting of children with developmental abnormalities such as Down syndrome, euthanasia, and the treatment of children with gender dysphoria are very important. However, my most pressing concern related to bioethics in our society is freedom of conscience.

It is important that we express clearly the value of human life and how that impacts how we understand the ethics of things such as reproductive technology, abortion and euthanasia, but we are living in a time in which many do not listen to reasoned arguments about what is right. Much of our society believes that what is right is determined by how they feel and they desire to be free of any limits on what they can do. They also believe, somewhat contradictorily, that they should be affirmed in being able to do what they desire by having society help them do it; even if that means that others need to do things that they believe to be wrong. Our society is losing the concept of any objective moral values. Without objective moral values it does not make sense for someone to refuse another person’s request for help in fulfilling their desires based on conscience, particularly conscience informed by an objective understanding of right and wrong.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

In Defense of a Physician’s Right to Conscientious Objection, Part 2

Guest post by Cheyn Onarecker, MD

Today, I am continuing my comments on the recent editorial against conscientious objections from the New England Journal of Medicine (subscription required). My previous objections to the elimination of protections for conscientious objections included: 1) the importance of maintaining the traditional balance that has always existed between the needs of the patient and the physician, and 2) the fact that medical societies make decisions on the acceptability of certain procedures that are influenced by society and do not represent the views of a large percentage of its members. I will now add a couple more reasons.

Third, it is impractical and unreasonable to demand that persons considering a career in medicine should be prepared to violate their moral convictions. When the Church Amendment was passed in 1973, allowing physicians to be exempt from performing abortions, there was no outcry from the AMA or any other medical society denouncing the law or declaring that rights of conscience were unethical. Since then, the number of laws and provisions to protect conscience rights have increased, not decreased. Philosopher Mark Wicclair explains that modern medicine, in general, has accepted the right of conscientious objection, and no young person entering medicine today believes that their moral and religious convictions are incompatible with a career in medicine. In fact, the AMA issued a directive to medical schools to excuse students from performing activities that violate their ethical beliefs. Not only that, but how would physicians be able to predict that someday their chosen specialty would develop a controversial treatment?

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

In Defense of a Physician’s Right of Conscientious Objection

Guest post by Cheyn Onarecker, MD

In their recent “Sounding Board” piece in the New England Journal of Medicine (subscription required), Ronit Stahl, PhD, and Ezekiel Emanuel, MD, PhD, denounce the rights of physicians and other health care professionals to opt out of certain procedures because of a moral or religious belief. The interests and rights of the patient, they state, should always trump those of the clinician. The only role for conscientious objection, in their view, is a limited one, when the appropriateness of a treatment or procedure is being debated.

Once a professional society determines that a treatment is acceptable, the physician must comply or get out of medicine altogether. Stahl and Ezekiel lament that the American Medical Association (AMA) and other medical societies support conscience rights, but, I believe the arguments they advance to eliminate such rights are not convincing and would jeopardize the future of medicine.

First, although the well-being of patients is one of the primary goals of medicine, there has always been a balance between the needs of patients and physicians. Otherwise, physicians would work 24 hours a day, with no time off for family, friends, or other pursuits. Physicians would be expected to respond to all patient requests, day or night. The question is not whether physicians should put patients’ needs above their own, but where the line should be drawn between the needs of the patient and the physician. In emergencies, a patient’s needs triumph, but other situations are not always so clear. When it comes to requests for treatments that violate a physician’s deepest moral convictions, no physician should be forced to cross over the line.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Mailbag

Brief comments on four short articles from this week, on disparate topics:

James Capretta of the American Enterprise Institute (meaning he is politically right of center) pleads in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) for compromise between Republicans and Democrats on further healthcare policy reform.  Arguing that the House-passed American Health Care Act (AHCA) may never pass, he believes that a better result politically and for public policy would be if legislators could, in essence, split the difference between the AHCA and current law, the Affordable Care Act (ACA, aka “Obamacare”) on some points where he sees some agreements in principle.  He proposes: 1) a hybrid approach between the ACA’s income-based tax credits for health insurance purchase and the AHCA’s age-based approach; 2) ensuring continuous insurance coverage for people with pre-existing conditions by modifying the ACA’s penalties for not being insured to fall more heavily on higher-income people; 3) setting limits on the favorable tax treatment of employer-paid health insurance premiums; 4) automatically enrolling uninsured people into a bare-bones, no-premium plan from which they could opt out in favor of re-enrollment in a different plan (a proposal that sounds to me a lot like the Democrats’ “public option” with a guaranteed fight over scope of coverage); and 5) limiting Medicaid expansion to tie it to reform of the program (something that sounds to me a lot like what I understand is currently in the AHCA).  Mr. Capretta knows a lot more about health policy than I, and has been at it a lot longer. 

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

The Forgotten Woman of Socialized Medicine [1]

In Sweden, there is an ongoing battle in midwifery between conscience rights and abortion rights and abortion rights are presently winning. A recent Wall Street Journal article provides an excellent background and summary of the situation of one Ellinor Grimmarck, a 40-year-old Christian, mother of two, who quit her job in 2007 to return to school to become a midwife. In Sweden, there is an… // Read More »

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.