Tag: abortion

Bioethics Blogs

Charlie Gard: Three Issues That Did Not Make Social Media

by Ann Mongoven, Ph.D., MPH

All hearts go out to the Gard family in this time of grief for their son, Charlie.

The legal wrangling over Charlie’s care became a political football–unfortunately, about many things having little to do with Charlie.

Despite the involvement of Pope Francis, this was not a case about abortion rights or the sanctity of human life. Catholic tradition warns both that quality-of-life arguments can dehumanize the disabled, and that unduly burdensome medical care can become assaultive. There is no “Catholic” view of the case, and Catholic moral theologians disagree about it.

Despite the involvement of Donald Trump, this was not a case about the relative merits of the U.K. National Health Service (NHS) versus other health systems. It was not a case of utilitarian ethics pitted against duty-based ethics or love. The NHS provided extremely expensive intensive care for Charlie for most of his life, and British courts governed cases related to his care solely by a “best interest of the child” standard– amidst heated disagreement between Charlie’s parents and doctors about his interests. The European Court of Human Rights backed the British court decision.

The case did address questions about who should decide when parents and doctors disagree about a child’s medical interest. But contrary to some portrayals in the American press, it neither changed conventional parameters for addressing those questions, nor exposed major differences in legal reasoning used to address them in the U.K. and the U.S.  Both countries appeal to “best interest” standards for resolution, and both reject an absolutist interpretation of parental rights.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Fake News and Partisan Epistemology

by Regina Rini

ABSTRACT. This paper does four things: (1) It provides an analysis of the concept ‘fake news.’ (2) It identifies distinctive epistemic features of social media testimony. (3) It argues that partisanship-in-testimony-reception is not always epistemically vicious; in fact some forms of partisanship are consistent with individual epistemic virtue. (4) It argues that a solution to the problem of fake news will require changes to institutions, such as social media platforms, not just to individual epistemic practices.

Did you know that Hillary Clinton sold weapons to ISIS? Or that Mike Pence called Michelle Obama “the most vulgar First Lady we’ve ever had”? No, you didn’t know these things. You couldn’t know them, because these claims are false.[1] But many American voters believed them.

One of the most distinctive features of the 2016 campaign was the rise of “fake news,” factually false claims circulated on social media, usually via channels of partisan camaraderie. Media analysts and social scientists are still debating what role fake news played in Trump’s victory.[2] But whether or not it drove the outcome, fake news certainly affected the choices of some individual voters.

Why were people willing to believe easily dis-confirmable, often ridiculous, stories? In this paper I will suggest the following answer: people believe fake news because they acquire it through social media sharing, which is a peculiar sort of testimony. Social media sharing has features that reduce audience willingness to think critically or check facts. This effect is amplified when the testifier and audience share a partisan orientation.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Medical tourism for controversial treatment options

By Dominic Wilkinson

 

Baby C’s parents had done their research. They had read widely about different options for C and had clear views about what they felt would be best for their child. They had asked a number of doctors in this country, but none were willing to provide the treatment. After contacting some specialists overseas, they had found one expert who agreed. If the family were able to pay for treatment, he was willing to provide that treatment option.

However, when C’s local doctors discovered that the parents planned to leave the country for treatment the doctors embarked on court proceedings and contacted the police.

One of the questions highlighted in the Charlie Gard case has been whether his parents should be free to travel overseas for desired experimental treatment. It has been claimed that the NHS and Great Ormond St are “keeping him captive”. Why shouldn’t C’s parents be free to travel to access a medical treatment option? When, if ever, should a state intervene to prevent medical tourism?

On the face of it, stopping patients or parents from undertaking medical tourism appears to violate two important freedoms – the freedom to travel and the freedom to make decisions about medical treatment. There might be reason for a country not to provide a particular treatment option – for example because it is unaffordable within a public healthcare system, or because doctors in that country do not approve of it, or lack experience or expertise in providing it. But why should patients or parents be prevented from accessing treatment overseas.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

Charlie Gard: Judge Allows Parents of Terminally Ill Infant to Consult American Doctor

A London High Court judge has ruled that terminally ill infant Charlie Gard can be examined by a doctor from the United States, amidst his parents’ battle to pursue experimental therapy abroad instead of the terminated life support prescribed by his British doctors. The 11-month-old infant was born with mitochondrial DNA depletion syndrome, a rare genetic condition that causes muscular degeneration, respiratory failure and motor skill decline. Most children with the disease fail to live past early childhood; Charlie’s doctors have stated that it will eventually cause his death.

In Britain, courts rather than parents dictate children’s best interests in the face of opposing medical advice. Though Charlie’s doctors at Great Ormond Street Hospital were granted court permission in April to remove the infant from life support, Charlie’s parents’ lawyers have since been advocating for the right to maintain life support and pursue alternative therapy despite his doctors’ insistence on the low likelihood of the proposed therapy’s effectiveness, and the high likelihood of lifelong pain with the disease.

The high-profile case has attracted the attention of President Trump, Pope Francis, and anti-abortion groups, all of whom have vocalized their support for Charlie’s parents interests. Several notable medical authorities and colleges have expressed their support for the hospital’s consensus or condemned the politicization of the case. 

Following the judge’s novel permission, a New York-Presbyterian Hospital/Columbia University Medical Center neurologist will evaluate the potential effectiveness of a nucleoside therapy that has successfully prolonged the lifespan of similarly ill patients, though such patients’ conditions have owed to a mutation distinct from Charlie’s.

The case pivots on several bioethical questions that are particularly acute in the context of terminal illness. Where should the law draw the line between parental authority and medical authority? Whose preferences speak for a voiceless patient?

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

Pope Francis’ Appointments to Bioethics Board Suggest Progressive Turn

Four notable American ethicists have been appointed by Pope Francis to his bioethics advisory board, and are projected to potentially “temper the group’s conservative views on sexual morality and life issues,” according to the National Catholic Reporter. The group is among 45 international members of the Pontifical Academy for Life, composed of both renewed and newly added experts that will counsel the pontiff on bioethical challenges.

Pope Francis has thus far maintained the Church’s opposition to abortion, contraception, abortion and euthanasia. In 2016, he defined human life as encompassing “conception to natural death.”

The group of American ethicists includes John Haas (President of the National Catholic Bioethics Center, Philadelphia), Ignatius John Keown (Professor of Christian Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington), Kathleen Foley (Neurologist at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, New York, and Professor of Neurology, Cornell University, Ithaca), and Carl Anderson (CEO and Chairman of the Knights of Columbus, Connecticut [a Catholic-based fraternal service organization]).

Though reappointed member Anderson resolutely opposes abortion, the stances of other new board members “reflect a desire for a less combative tone on the issue,” noted the Reporter. Additionally, some members who had vocalized opposition to a Vatican conference on infertility at which certain ethicists had not endorsed Church positions were not invited to rejoin the board.

The post Pope Francis’ Appointments to Bioethics Board Suggest Progressive Turn appeared first on Global Bioethics Initiative (GBI).

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

Charlie Gard, the New England Journal of Medicine, and the Limits of “Conscience”

I would venture that most bioethicists would agree it would be ethically permissible to remove life support and active care from little Charlie Gard, and let him die.   The hospital in Britain where he has been receiving his care wants to do that, and the courts agree.  But why do they insist on this action when his parents want to transfer him for another try at experimental treatment, have raised the money, and reportedly have a center in the US willing to accept him for such an attempt?

I can think of two reasons.  One is a frank utilitarian insistence on limiting costs.  It has been publicly charged that is precisely the motive for this and similar recent cases in the U.S.

Or it could be that those caregivers who argue against the futility of such care do so on conscience grounds.  This is at least a more charitable reading.

But if that is the case, then might we not ask:  on what grounds do such conscience concerns mandate blocking the wishes of the baby’s parents—setting aside just how quickly the futility of further care would be evident?  It is commonly argued that practitioners who wish not to provide abortions or participate in assisted suicide retain a professional obligation to refer to someone who will perform the procedure in question.

So why don’t we demand that the British hospital actively refer Charlie’s parents to another facility?  Just wondering…

Maybe the parents in this case are the ones appealing to conscience, but, in the view of the medicolegal authorities, wrongly so. 

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

Ethical issues in foetal genome sequencing. New level of complexity to medical, family and social decisions resulting from this prenatal diagnosis

Regardless of the legal judgment that abortion deserves in different countries, any action that may induce or facilitate abortion is ethically unacceptable.

In 2012, a technique was developed that enabled the foetal genome to be determined in the first trimester of pregnancy, using a small sample of the mother’s blood (Nature 2012, 487,320-4. Erratum Nature 2012; 489,326). This attractive novel technique has opened up new medical possibilities, but also objective ethical questions. A recent article published in the New England Journal of Medicine (370; 195-197) discussed this topic.

There is no doubt that this new possibility adds a new level of complexity to medical, family and social decisions resulting from prenatal diagnosis.

As discussed in the article, information can be obtained on some foetal medical issues with the usual methods, such as chorionic villus sampling or amniocentesis. With genomic analysis however, information can not only be obtained on possible diseases, but also on types of autosomal recessive diseases (e.g. Tay-Sachs disease), or the risk that the future child will develop a disease such as diabetes or some type of cancer in adulthood, especially breast and ovarian cancer in women. Knowing the risks of future diseases can be used for the good of the foetus, if prenatal treatments can be applied, but also against their life if abortion is favoured.

This therefore raises several ethical questions, such as, “Should foetal genome studies be routinely offered to everyone?” or “Are parents entitled to know their future child’s genetic information?” One criterion that is probably essential to establish the ethicality of these practices, is that they are always used in the best interests of the child.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

Genome sequencing in foetal .This prenatal diagnosis arrises a new level of complexity to medical, family and social decisions

Regardless of the legal judgment that abortion deserves in different countries, any action that may induce or facilitate abortion is ethically unacceptable.

In 2012, a technique was developed that enabled the foetal genome to be determined in the first trimester of pregnancy, using a small sample of the mother’s blood (Nature 2012, 487,320-4. Erratum Nature 2012; 489,326). This attractive novel technique has opened up new medical possibilities, but also objective ethical questions. A recent article published in the New England Journal of Medicine (370; 195-197) discussed this topic.

There is no doubt that this new possibility adds a new level of complexity to medical, family and social decisions resulting from prenatal diagnosis.

As discussed in the article, information can be obtained on some foetal medical issues with the usual methods, such as chorionic villus sampling or amniocentesis. With genomic analysis however, information can not only be obtained on possible diseases, but also on types of autosomal recessive diseases (e.g. Tay-Sachs disease), or the risk that the future child will develop a disease such as diabetes or some type of cancer in adulthood, especially breast and ovarian cancer in women. Knowing the risks of future diseases can be used for the good of the foetus, if prenatal treatments can be applied, but also against their life if abortion is favoured.

This therefore raises several ethical questions, such as, “Should foetal genome studies be routinely offered to everyone?” or “Are parents entitled to know their future child’s genetic information?” One criterion that is probably essential to establish the ethicality of these practices, is that they are always used in the best interests of the child.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics Blogs

The Limits of Choice: Abortion and Assisted Dying

Michelle Oberman compares abortion and assisted dying and argues that focusing on the ‘right to choose’ risks ignoring the social and economic factors that shape and constrain our choices.

__________________________________________

I’ve watched the trend toward legalizing physician assistance in dying with a vague sense of alarm. My peers, healthy and wealthy, are puzzled by my response. How is this different from abortion, they ask? You’re pro-choice on abortion, so why wouldn’t you be for assisted dying?

Here’s my problem: As much as I support reproductive rights, I am weary of the rhetoric of ‘choice’ as it applies to great swaths of women who have abortions. I’ve spent the past six years studying abortion in the United States, and in countries like El Salvador where abortion is completely banned. The more I’ve learned about why many women have abortions, the less I see abortion as a choice. Abortion is often a coerced response to desperate circumstances.

When we focus on the question of choice – framing the issue as one of individual liberty – we ignore entirely the social and economic factors that shape and constrain choice. Such constraints lead many women to undergo abortions they might otherwise deeply prefer to avoid. The most common reason that women give for seeking an abortion is financial. It is expensive to have a baby, to pay for day care, to feed, clothe, and house a child. For marginally-employed women, having a baby necessarily means plunging themselves and their families deeper into poverty.

We’ve spent decades fighting over abortion, yet we have done little to offset the economic pressures that compel some women to have one.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.

Bioethics News

The United States Government has presented an amend to abolishe Planned Parenthood government subsidies

The current Government of the United States has presented an amend to the “Affordable Care Act“, with the result that they will not longer awarding Planned Parenthood 500 million Euros annually, around two fifths of their total budget. Planned Parenthood has 57 local affiliates that operate around 650 health centres in the United States. In 2015, the organisation received $553 million from federal funds, $309 million from private insurers, $353 million in donations and $80 million from other sources. According to their own figures, 2.5 million people use their facilities every year, and they believe that 1 in 5 American women has visited a centre at least once in her life (JAMA 177; 307-308, 2017).

Official reasons to defund Pllaned Parethood, “We don’t want to commit taxpayer funding for abortion, and Planned Parenthood is the largest abortion provider,” House Speaker Paul Ryan said during a CNN town hall .

Planned parenthood government subsidies to promote abortion also in other countries.

A step has been made in last februay when President Trump signed an executive order barring federal funds from organizations that promote abortion around the world, including the International Planned Parenthood Federation.

Photo The MQ

La entrada The United States Government has presented an amend to abolishe Planned Parenthood government subsidies aparece primero en Bioethics Observatory.

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.