Guest Post: William Simkulet
Paper: The Cursed Lamp: The Problem of Spontaneous Abortion
For many people, the moral status of abortion stands or falls whether or not a human fetus is morally comparable to you or I; whether its death is a significant loss. Many people believe human fetuses have a right to life from conception, and thus conclude that there is good reason to think induced abortion is seriously morally wrong. Judith Jarvis Thomson challenges this belief, constructing a scenario where she believes it is morally acceptable to end the life of a person because although he has a right to life, his right to life does not give him a right to use your body. Her example should be familiar:
Violinist: You wake up in the hospital, surgically attached to a violinist. Your doctor explains that last night the Society of Music Lovers kidnapped the two of you and performed the surgery. The violinist has a serious condition that will result in his death soon unless he remains attached to your kidneys for the next 9 months (you alone are biologically compatible).
The violinist has a right to life, and surely you are free to let him remain attached to your body to save his life. It would be a great kindness for you to do so, but Thomson says that the violinist’s right to life does not give him the right to use your body. Anti-abortion theories that focus on the moral status of the fetus neglect to show why the fetus’s moral status – its argued for right to life – would give it a right to use the woman’s body.
The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.