I would venture that most bioethicists would agree it would be ethically permissible to remove life support and active care from little Charlie Gard, and let him die. The hospital in Britain where he has been receiving his care wants to do that, and the courts agree. But why do they insist on this action when his parents want to transfer him for another try at experimental treatment, have raised the money, and reportedly have a center in the US willing to accept him for such an attempt?
I can think of two reasons. One is a frank utilitarian insistence on limiting costs. It has been publicly charged that is precisely the motive for this and similar recent cases in the U.S.
Or it could be that those caregivers who argue against the futility of such care do so on conscience grounds. This is at least a more charitable reading.
But if that is the case, then might we not ask: on what grounds do such conscience concerns mandate blocking the wishes of the baby’s parents—setting aside just how quickly the futility of further care would be evident? It is commonly argued that practitioners who wish not to provide abortions or participate in assisted suicide retain a professional obligation to refer to someone who will perform the procedure in question.
So why don’t we demand that the British hospital actively refer Charlie’s parents to another facility? Just wondering…
Maybe the parents in this case are the ones appealing to conscience, but, in the view of the medicolegal authorities, wrongly so. In postings dated June 2 and June 6 of this year, this blog carried a 2-part rejoinder to an April 6 article in the New England Journal of Medicine that took the position that conscientious objection by medical practitioners should be considered unethical.
The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.