For a few reasons, I’ve been thinking a bit over the last few months about professionalism and professional codes. In fact, that’s the topic that’s attracted most of my attention here since… oooh, ages ago. I find the idea of a code of professional ethics troubling in many ways, but also fascinating. And one of the fascinating questions has to do with what they’re for.
They can’t be meant as a particularly useful tool for solving deep moral dilemmas: they’re much too blunt for that, often presuppose too much, and tend to bend to suit the law. To think that because the relevant professional code enjoins x it follows that x is permissible or right smacks of a simple appeal to authority, and this flies in the face of what it is to be a moral agent in the first place. But what a professional code of ethics may do is to provide a certain kind of Bolamesque legal defence: if your having done φ attracts a claim that it’s negligent or unreasonable or something like that, being able to point out that your professional body endorses φ-ing will help you out. But professional ethics, and what counts as professional discipline, stretches way beyond that. For example, instances of workplace bullying can be matters of great professional and ethical import, but it’s not at all obvious that the law should be involved.
There’s a range of reasons why someone’s behaviour might be of professional ethical concern. Perhaps the most obvious is a concern for public protection.
The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.