This week, a New York judge dismissed a case seeking to free and grant personhood to two chimpanzees being used in studies by Stoney Brook University. Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Barbara Jaffe issued a thirty-three page document outlining the reasoning behind her decision. A higher court had ruled on a similar case last year, so she was bound to follow suite.
The Nonhuman Rights Project, who sought to free these chimps, made arguments for personhood based on their powers of cognition and “their similarity to humans in DNA composition, communication, and self-awareness.”
There is more at stake with these kinds of decision than the rights of nonhuman animals, however. The kinds of arguments used to grant personhood to nonhuman animals also run the risk of questioning and potentially even removing the status of personhood from some humans. If we are to follow these kinds of criterion for personhood, we risk alienating young children, the elderly, and the disabled from having personhood.
Animal rights and pro-choice activists often have a similar list of qualifications for personhood that, either intentionally or unintentionally, exclude some people from personhood. In her famous argument against granting personhood to fetuses, Marry Anne Warren cites five necessary conditions for personhood:
3. Self-Motivated Activity
4. The Capacity to Communicate
If a being fails to meet any of one these criteria, Warren argues, that being is not a person. While her argument was designed to prove that a fetus is not a person, it is also strikingly similar to the arguments used by the Nonhuman Rights Project.
The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.