Guest post by Kirsty Keywood (University of Manchester)
On 11th March Nadine Montgomery won her case before the UK Supreme Court to gain compensation for the failure of her obstetrician to warn her of risks associated with the vaginal delivery of a large infant – a risk which she would have averted by requesting a caesarean section. Shortly after his birth, her son was diagnosed with cerebral palsy and a brachial plexus injury, resulting from the occlusion of the placenta during a “very stressful” vaginal delivery.
Nadine Montgomery had diabetes, which increased her chances of giving birth to a larger than average-sized baby. This, in conjunction with her small stature (she was 5 feet tall), indicated a risk that a natural delivery would bring with it a 9-10% chance of shoulder dystocia. Were dystocia to occur, attempts to dislodge the infant’s shoulders through mechanical manoeuvres would generate a risk of occlusion of the umbilical cord resulting in death or cerebral palsy of 0.1%. According to the obstetrician, Dr McLellan, the risk of shoulder dystocia did not merit specific mention in discussions with diabetic patients, because the risk of an adverse event associated with shoulder dystocia was very small indeed.
Mrs Montgomery’s case before the UK Supreme Court hinged on the question of the nature of the obstetrician’s duty to the patient. Was the obligation to warn of inherent risks to be determined by reference to the Bolam principle – a principle which enables the judiciary to determine liability in cases where the defendant possessed skills and expertise that are beyond the ability of the judge to determine without expert testimony?
The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.