Bioethics Blogs

Failures and Risks in Biosafety Regulation

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) suffered real embarrassment the other week, and we are all very fortunate that the consequences were not worse. Dozens of employees “were potentially exposed to deadly anthrax spores” (though no one got sick) and a lethal strain of flu virus accidentally contaminated a much milder sample that was distributed to a Department of Agriculture labMeanwhile, six 60-year-old vials of smallpox virus were found in an old refrigerator at NIH, two of which contained live specimens.

As Laurie Garrett eloquently put it: Oops. Her must-read piece in Foreign Policy was titled:

It’s 10 o’Clock — Do You Know Where Your Bubonic Plague Is?
Spilled smallpox, missing SARS, and rogue scientists with mutant H1N1. If you’re not scared, you should be.

The “missing SARS” refers to an incident in France last year; not CDC, but certainly fitting the pattern. The agency’s head, Thomas R. Frieden, was appropriately “stunned and appalled” by the recent incidents (especially since no one had even told him immediately about the flu error). We can assume that, even if heads don’t roll, procedures will be tightened and many presumably sensible changes will be made. As The New York Times noted solemnly in an editorial:

A small careless error in these experiments could be devastating.

These revelations provide the context for an unusual proposal of caution and public consultation made by a number of very prominent scientists last week. A group of researchers has proposed that policymakers and the public carefully consider the consequences before the introduction of a new practice known as “gene drives,” which could lead to “addressing ecological problems by altering entire populations of wild organisms.”

The views, opinions and positions expressed by these authors and blogs are theirs and do not necessarily represent that of the Bioethics Research Library and Kennedy Institute of Ethics or Georgetown University.